Toronto Estate Lawyer : Hull & Hull Law Firm : Trust Mediation and Succession Planning : Serving Ontario, Ottawa, Mississauga, Hamilton

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My last blog this week examines the application of our favourite Rule 57.07 - Liability of Solicitor for Costs - in the context of affidavits.  We (and our clients) have all suffered through The Angry Affidavit.  In Manitoba, which has comparable legislative provisions authorizing and governing cost awards, drafting such an affidavit can be expensive for the drafting lawyer.   

In Eblie v. Yankowski, [2007] M.J. No. 145, the court awarded costs against the solicitor personally where an affidavit contained irrelevant, scandalous, vexatious and frivolous.  It was not enough to simply type what the client wanted to say.  The solicitor was responsible for drafting and presenting the affidavit material, and had caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause.  In this case, the costs incurred included a motion to expunge the impugned material. 

Further, the court made the interesting comment: "It is difficult to accept that these materials were not prepared and filed for an improper purpose, namely to prejudice the mind of the court against the opposite party. If their inclusion in the affidavit filed by the Petitioner was intended to gain undue advantage and to defeat the course of justice costs against counsel personally are clearly warranted."  

For those interested, section 96 of Manitoba's Court of Queen's Bench Act is nearly identical to section 131 of Ontario's Courts of Justice Act in creating jurisdiction to make discretionary cost awards.   Manitoba's Rule 57.01(1) is similar in all relevant ways to Ontario's Rule 57.01(1), and Manitoba's Rule 57.07 similarly imposes potential personal liabilty on solicitors.

Enjoy your weekend,

Chris Graham

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When an irresistable force meets an immovable object, we appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. 

In Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of Health, 2008 SCC 44, the force is the Personal Information Protection of Electronic Documents Act ("PIPEDA") and the object is solicitor-client privilege.  Section 12 of PIPEDA grants the Privacy Commissioner express statutory power to compel a person to produce any records that the Privacy Commissioner considers necessary to investigate a complaint “in the same manner and to the same extent as a superior court of record”.  The issue in Blood Tribe was whether this conferred a right of access to documents protected by solicitor-client privilege.  The Court held unanimously that the broad grant did not contain the requisite specific express authority to override privilege.

The Court stated the rule that "general words of a statutory grant of authority to an office holder such as an ombudsperson or a regulator do not confer a right to access solicitor-client documents, even for the limited purpose of determining whether the privilege is properly claimed.  That role is reserved to the courts.  Express words are necessary to permit a regulator or other statutory official to “pierce” the privilege." 

The Court also noted that "while the solicitor-client privilege may have started life as a rule of evidence, it is now unquestionably a rule of substance applicable to all interactions between a client and his or her lawyer when the lawyer is engaged in providing legal advice or otherwise acting as a lawyer rather than as a business counsellor or in some other non-legal capacity."

Speaking of the Supreme Court of Canada, the law you're looking for just might be in the "unreported judgments" section of the Supreme Court's user-friendly website.  How does a Supreme Court decision go unreported?

Have a great day,

Chris Graham

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Who can forget the sad case of Terry Schiavo, the poor lady who suffered catastrophic brain damage in 1990 and was kept alive in a vegetative state on a feeding tube for 15 years?  Readers will remember the anguish involved when her husband was forced to litigate against her parents in order to get the tube removed so Terry could die in peace.  This became a powerful argument in favour of a "Living Will", which is basically a document in which individuals outline their "personal choices" regarding end-of-life treatments.  Living Wills became a feel-good legal product, a perceived solution to the heart-rending situations like Terry's.

Too bad the research shows that Living Wills may not live up to the hype.  According to a recent study by two University of California Irvine researchers, Professors Peter Ditto and Elizabeth Loftus, Living Wills appear to have serious defects.  One problem is that patient preferences change over time.  For instance, one tends to be more inclined against end-of-life treatments immediately after a hospital stay, but this changes with time.  Also, positive treatment results of family members make a patient more inclined to end-of-life treatment.  Many people who make Living Wills change their preferences but forget about their Living Will, or misidentify those preferences in the Living Will. 

Perhaps the most glaring weakness is that Living Wills do not appear to provide guidance  to surrogates who have read them.  According to the study, the accuracy of a surrogate who has read a Living Will in prediciting a loved one's treatment preferences is no higher than that of a surrogate who has not read the Living Will.  So a Living Will can be totally inconsistent with the patient's most recent intentions.   

Having a Living Will apparently makes both the patients and the surrogates feel better, so it's not all bad news. 

Have a safe day,

Chris Graham

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What happens when the Bill a legislature votes for is different than the Bill the Head of State signs?

A fascinating story is playing out down south: the U.S. Congress voted for a highway funding bill, which the President later signed into law.  But someone altered an "earmark" provision after Congress voted, so the bill the President signed was slightly different than the bill Congress voted on.   Specifically, a $10 million earmark was changed to redirect funds to upgrading an apparently useless stretch of road.  It turns out the locals don't even want the road built.

The Senate is seeking a federal inquiry  and Congress may seek a criminal probe.  Hopefully the constitutional aspect gets some consideration before (righteous) outrage drowns out the interesting constitutional aspect.  Is this rogue Bill a law?  Is what the President signed legally different than what the Congress approved?  What would the result be here in Canada, if a section of a regulation, for instance, was altered after a Parliamentary vote? 

One thing is certain: our friends down south will spend far more than $10 million getting to the bottom of this.

Enjoy your week,

Chris Graham