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Today is the final installment of my discussion of Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.).

After dismissing the will challenge on the basis of due execution, testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval, the court turned to the issue of undue influence. Despite the presence of suspicious circumstances, the court held that the challengers, not the propounder, had the burden of proving undue influence. However, while the son did not have the burden of disproving coercion, his evidence was to be tested against the preponderance of probabilities that rationally emerge out the all the evidence in the case.

The deceased was found to be vulnerable and dependant upon her son for all aspects of her existence. Conversely, the son was found to have an aggressive and domineering personality, both in general and with respect to his desire for absolute ownership of the family holding company.

The court found that the son was very caring of his mother. However, it did not accept his evidence on the issue of undue influence. The court asked a number of rhetorical questions as to why the mother would make the will that she did, despite the circumstances. The court concluded that that will was procured by the undue influence of the son.

The will was therefore found to be invalid.

Paul Trudelle

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Yesterday, I discussed Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.), and the finding of the judge that suspicious circumstances existed, placing the onus back on the propounder to prove testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval.

As to testamentary capacity, the court referred to the oft – quoted decision of Banks v. Goodfellow, and the test for testamentary capacity.

It noted that the capacity required to direct the distribution of one’s estate by Will is “modest”. To be of a sound and disposing mind and memory, a testator must:

1. be aware that they are making a will that takes effect on their death;
2. understand the nature and extent of the estate to be disposed of by Will;
3. be aware of those having a claim to the estate;
4. have no disorder of the mind.

The court reviewed the evidence of the plaintiffs and the witnesses (other than the son) as to testamentary capacity. The court was satisfied that on the preponderance of the evidence, the testator had the necessary capacity to direct the disposition of her estate by will as of the date of the will.

As to knowledge and approval, the court noted that a suspicious circumstances raised in the case required that the son, as the propounder of the will, prove that the deceased knew of and approved of the contents of the will. The court did not accept the evidence of the son to the effect that the deceased had to carefully read her will and discuss it with him on numerous occasions. Despite this, the court concluded that the deceased knew of the provisions of the will that she signed.

To this point, the will survived most of the challenges to it. Will the will be accepted to probate? Can it withstand the final challenge: undue influence? Tune in tomorrow.

Paul Trudelle

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Yesterday, I introduced the will challenge decision of Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.).

After disposing of the issue of due execution, the court turned to the doctrine of “suspicious circumstances”. The court referred to these Supreme Court of Canada decision of Vout v. Hay, where it was held that suspicious circumstances maybe raised by circumstances surrounding the preparation of the will, circumstances tending to call into question the capacity of the testator; or circumstances tending to show that the free will of the testator was overborne by acts of coercion or fraud.

Generally, the propounder of a will has the legal burden with respect to due execution, knowledge and approval, and testamentary capacity. However, upon proof that the will was duly executed, the propounder is aided by the rebuttable presumption that the testator knew and approved of the contents and had the necessary testamentary capacity.

The burden of establishing suspicious circumstances rests on those attacking the will. If evidence can be adduced which, if accepted, would tend to negative knowledge and approval or testamentary capacity, this burden is satisfied and the legal burden reverts to the propounder.

In Hix, it was the son who drafted the challenged will. The Court quoted from Vout v. Hay as follows:

“… if a party writes or prepares a Will, under which he takes a benefit, that is a circumstance that ought generally to excite suspicion of the Court, and calls upon it to be vigilant and jealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument, in favour of which it ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the paper propounded does express the true Will of the deceased.”

The court concluded that the son should never have agreed to draw the will for the deceased. The fact that he did in the circumstances “does more than raise suspicion; it cries out for it.”

Tomorrow: testamentary capacity, and knowledge and approval

Paul Trudelle

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A recent case out of the British Colombia Supreme Court provides an excellent illustration and discussion of various grounds upon which a will can be challenged.

In Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.), the deceased was survived by a son and two daughters. The deceased, the son and the two daughters had varying levels of shareholdings in a holding company.

In a prior will, the deceased left her estate to her three children, equally. In a will drawn January 11, 2004, the deceased left her estate to her three children equally, on the condition that the two daughters transferred their shareholdings in the holding company to the son. The deceased died on June 1, 2006 at the age of 90. The daughters challenged the validity of the will, and the court considered the validity of the will from a number of perspectives.

The court first considered the issue of due execution of the will. The formal requirements necessary to execute a valid will are set out in the relevant legislation. While the court was not prepared to accept the evidence of the son with respect to the execution of the deceased’s will, it did accept the evidence of one of the two witnesses to the will. The court was satisfied that the will was signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses who were present at the same time and who subscribed the will in the presence of each other and the testator.

Court concluded that the will was validly executed. This aspect of the will challenge was rejected.

More tomorrow.

Paul Trudelle