Retirement: Good News and Bad News

A recent article by Ted Rechtshafen in the Globe online edition encourages us to think about our retirement prospects, and plan for them.

The author notes that in 1921, the average life expectancy for a Canadian male was 58.8 years, while the mandatory retirement age was usually 65. At that time, financial planning for retirement was not an issue for most.

Good news: life expectancies have gone way up. Bad news: we now need to plan for a (hopefully) much longer retirement. Most Canadians should plan for, conservatively, a 30-year retirement!

Planning for retirement means considering the following basic questions:

-Do I need to think about ways to work beyond age 60-65?

-Am I saving enough for retirement?

-What is my world going to look like in 25 years?

The article contains links to tools such as a detailed “How long will I live” calculator. The calculator is eye-opening and instructive, and worth a visit. Other links include a “How much money will I have at the end” calculator, which estimates the value of your estate, assuming you live to a full life expectancy. Again, eye-opening.

Thanks for reading.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle

The Valuation of Life Estates

Recently, I was looking over some of the leading cases in life estates. One of the questions that stood out in my mind was whether or not a life estate has a quantifiable value.

Aho v. Kelly, was heard in British Columbia in 1998, but remains a leading Canadian case that is often referred to when the valuation of life estates are being considered.

In Aho v. Kelly the wife and two children of the deceased were each left a 1/3 interest in the matrimonial home of the deceased. The court confirmed that the wife of the Deceased also held a life interest in the same matrimonial home, as per the jurisprudence in British Columbia. The wife commenced an application seeking a court order that the property be sold and the proceeds be unequally divided amongst the three owners of the property.

The wife argued that the proceeds should be unequally divided because she was entitled to further compensation as she had to be paid out for her life interest.

The Court held that a life estate is a property interest that has “some value”. The Honourable Justice Bauman stated that at common law a life estate is alienable, and that upon its transfer to another party it becomes an “estate pur autre vie” (that other life being the original life tenant). The Court concluded that the life interest has a value capable of capitalization, and that this value should be paid out of the proceeds from the sale of the house.

Aho v. Kelly is not binding in Ontario, however it goes a very far way in establishing the framework by which the value of the life interest can be calculated.

Thank you for reading and have a great day,

Rick Bickhram - Click here for more information on Rick Bickhram.
 

Correcting Beneficiary Designations

Declarations of beneficiaries of Life Insurance policies are sometimes thought to be “unassailable.” However, where a deceased’s first spouse is unexpectedly the named beneficiary of a life insurance policy owned by the deceased, the second spouse may have recourse to various legal remedies in an attempt to remedy what is argued to be an unjust situation. Inevitably, a Separation Agreement between the deceased and his or her first spouse is central to any such argument.

The recent decision of the Honourable Justice Strathy in Richardson (Estate Trustee of) v. Mew considered such a situation. The case also stands as an excellent summary of the recent jurisprudence that has developed in this area.

In short, the disappointed spouse can seek the remedies of either constructive trust or rectification. Justice Strathy points out that “except in exceptional circumstances” the Insurance Act requirements for the change of a beneficiary designation must be strictly interpreted. His Honour clearly had difficulty with understanding “how the designation of a beneficiary under a life insurance policy could be anything other than a juristic reason for an “enrichment.” Although he did not find this to be a case for the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction to rectify the policy, he left open the possibility that, in the right set of circumstances (i.e. clear evidence of a mistake), the court could properly employ such a remedy.

David M. Smith

 

Trillium Gift of Life Network Act: Donation of the Body or Body Parts

Normally, it is the estate trustee who has the authority to deal with the disposition of the deceased’s remains. A deceased’s stated wishes with respect to disposition, including donation, are seen as merely precatory.

However, Ontario’s Trillium Gift of Life Network Actvaries this usual authority, in a number of respects.

Firstly, a deceased’s consent to organ donation is “binding and is full authority for the use of the body…”.

Secondly, where the deceased has not specifically consented to a donation, the Act allows specified persons to consent to the donation of the person’s own body or body parts upon death. A spouse or other family members, in a specific order, are authorized to consent to such a donation if the deceased has not consented during his or her lifetime. One of the persons authorized to consent to the donation is “the person lawfully in possession of the body”. This appears to be a reference to the estate trustee.  However, the estate trustee’s authority to consent is low on the list, after the spouse, children, parents, siblings and other next of kin.

The consent of a spouse or other person listed in the legislation is “binding and full authority” for the use of the body. The legislation therefore appears to make a limited exception to the common law authority of the estate trustee.

Consent is not to be given if it is believed that the deceased would have objected during his or her lifetime, or if the deceased did not consent, if someone higher on the hierarchical list would object.

Have a great weekend.

Paul Trudelle