Toronto Estate Law Blog : Toronto Estate Lawyer : Hull & Hull Law Firm : Trust Mediation and Succession Planning : Serving Ontario, Ottawa, Mississauga, Hamilton

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Stieg Larsson’s latest book, The Girl Who Kicked the Hornet’s Nest, came out last week.

Earlier, Diane Vieira blogged here on the estate of the best-selling author, who died in 2004. Diane noted that Larsson’s common-law spouse of over 30 years received nothing from Larsson’s estate. Larsson died without a valid will, and his estate, estimated presently as having a value of $30 million, passed on an intestacy to his father and brother. Under Sweden’s inheritance laws, the common-law spouse received nothing, and did not have a claim against the estate.

In a lengthy New York Times Magazine article entitled “The Afterlife of Stieg Larsson”, Charles McGrath reports in detail on the life and events subsequent to the death of Larsson.

McGrath notes that Larsson died without a valid Will. (Apparently, Larrson did leave a 1977 will, in which he leaves his estate to the Socialist Party in Umea: the will was not witnessed and is said to have no legal validity.) Although his long-time companion, Eva Gabrielsson, received nothing from his estate, she has become an object of intense sympathy in Sweden.

Gabrielsson also has a laptop containing ¾ of a fourth novel by Larrson, and possibly an outline for others. Larsson’s estate offered to give her their half of Larsson’s apartment in exchange for the computer, but Gabriellson refused. Last November, the estate apparently offered her $2.6 million for the computer, but Gabrielsson didn’t respond.

McGrath states that while Gabrielsson has no claim, she has asserted “a kind of moral entitlement”. In a National Post article, Gabrielsson is said to be claiming that she co-authored the books.

As is usual in these types of matters, great animosity has developed between the spouse and the estate.

Thank you for reading.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

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Yesterday, I discussed Fort Sackville Foundation v. Darby Estate, 2010 NSSC 27 (CanLII). Today, I will discuss the matter of the costs of the proceedings, reported at .Fort Sackville Foundation v. Darby Estate, 2010 NSSC 45 (CanLII)

The court had dismissed the application by the charity for a declaration that it was the successor charity, or that it was entitled to the bequest upon the application of the cy-pres doctrine.

The charity requested solicitor and client costs from the estate. The successful residual beneficiaries suggested that the charity should receive no costs at all, or at best, party and party costs. The residual beneficiaries noted that any award of costs would come from their entitlement under the estate, and thus, in effect, the successful parties would be paying the unsuccessful party’s costs.

The court awarded solicitor and client costs to the charity. The court noted that the “dispute” was created less by the parties, and more by the wording used by the testator, which wording “fuelled” the issues. Although the arguments of the charity failed, they were “justified” arguments, and arguments “based on reason”.

In Ontario, the court has made similar costs rulings in circumstances where it can be said that the parties have acted reasonably in bringing the matter before the court. However, a different outcome might result if the court was of the view that one of the parties acted unreasonably.

Thank you for reading.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

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John Darby died in 2008. In his July 2007 Will, he left his residence and contents to the “Heritage Society of Bedford” [Nova Scotia] on specific conditions. The conditions included a requirement that the Society commit to retain his property and contents as a heritage property; a commitment to use the building to house a museum or some other specified uses; to make such commitments within 1 year; and to open the residence for the stipulated purposes within 3 years. If they did not, the property was to fall into the residue.

However, at the time of his death (or at the time of the making of the Will, for that matter), there was no entity known as the “Heritage Society of Bedford”. There was a charity known as the “Bedford Heritage Society”. However, that charity disposed of its assets and surrendered its certificate of incorporation many years earlier.

The Fort Sackville Foundation claimed that it was the successor charity. The court rejected this claim, holding that there was no amalgamation. While the court will take a broad approach to legal successorship in such circumstances, it cannot find a successor where an entity ceased to exist.

The court went on to consider whether the doctrine of cy-pres applied. The doctrine will be applied where:

a.      the gift as it stands is either impossible or impractical to effect; and

b.      the donor expressed a general charitable intent in making the gift.

The court held that neither test had been met. 

As to the first branch of the test, the gift was not impossible or impractical to effect. Because the gift provided for a gift-over, it could readily be given effect.

As to the second branch, the conditions of the gift narrowed the focus of the gift so as to take away a general charitable intent. The purpose of the gift was to preserve the deceased’s property. If that could not be done, the proceeds were to pass to the residual beneficiaries. Thus, it was held that there was no general charitable intent.

As a result, the proceeds of the sale passed to the residual beneficiaries.

See here for the reported decision.

Tomorrow, I will turn to the issue of costs.

Thank you for reading.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

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In honour of Victoria Day, celebrated in Canada on the last Monday of May on or before May 24, and considered the first long weekend of the summer, I thought I would consider the terms of the last Will and Testament of Queen Victoria.

Queen Victoria was born on May 24, 1819, and died on January 22, 1901. She became Queen at the age of 18, and reigned as monarch for over 63 years, being the longest reigning monarch in history. She had 9 children (she was predeceased by 3 of her children), including her successor to the throne, Edward VII.

Unfortunately, very little information can be found online about Queen Victoria’s Will. However, while searching, I discovered that a legacy of sorts was recently sold at auction in Scotland. Queen Victoria’s stockings (circa 1870) were sold earlier this year for 8,000 pounds (about $12,000 CDN).                                                    

The prior owner, Mary Youings, said that her late mother gained possession of the stockings around 1910. She said that she did not know the circumstances of how her mother gained possession of the stockings. The Telegraph reported that upon Queen Victoria’s death, her undergarments and much of her wardrobe were distributed to members of the royal household.

In July, 2008, Youings sold a pair of Queen Victoria’s 50” waist bloomers for 4,500 pounds.

I hope you enjoyed your Victoria Day Weekend, and got a “leg up” on summer.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

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Being immersed in the world of law, we're constantly confronted with upsetting and often depressing stories.  It feels good to occasionally resurface to hear about a positive story.  

In the London Evening Standard, David Cohen writes about the new queen of Soho, a 23 year old, named Fawn James.  For those of you who are not familiar with the area, Soho is located in the centre of the West End of London, England, in the City of Westminster.  

Fawn James inherited £75 million from her grandfather Paul Raymond, who was well known as Soho's property tycoon.  Paul died approximately one year ago.

In his article, Fawn James is described in a manner that we can all relate to at some point in our life, a student living on a budget.  One year later, Fawn is £75 million richer and both her and her family now controls 60 of Soho's 87 acres.

In her first interview since inheriting her grandfather's treasure chest Fawn says that her "first mission will be to make Soho greener.  We're looking at retrofitting our entire stock of buildings to make them more environmentally friendly".   She's also committed to her community, "I think it's important to support charities operating Soho and in the coming months I'll be assessing which one we want to assist."  As she reflects back on her time with her grandfather her only concern now is "to make him proud".  

Thank you for reading,


Rick Bickhram

 

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Ontario’s new harmonized sales tax is coming into effect on July 1, 2010. One of its effects will be to impose PST on funeral services: services that have previously been exempted from PST.

According to the harmonized sales tax, funeral services will now be taxed at the rate of 13%, up from 5%. The effect on a $5,000 funeral would be to raise the tax payable from $250 to $650.

The new harmonized tax may also have an effect on prepaid funeral services. According to a May 27, 2009 Toronto Star article, there are 224,257 prepaid funeral contracts in Ontario, and about 1 in 4 funerals in Ontario are prepaid.

The Ontario Minister of Finance has indicated that the government hopes to implement some sort of grandfathering clause, so that funeral services prepaid before a certain date remain exempted from the PST. However, nothing has been finalized yet. The cut-off date would likely be some time before July 1, 2010.

Those considering a prepaid funeral would be wise to complete their plans sooner rather than later. The new tax, like death, is approaching.

Thank you for reading.

Paul Trudelle

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An attorney acting under a power of attorney may be required to account to the beneficiaries of the grantor’s estate after the death of the grantor. This is the holding in the decision of McAllister Estate v. Hudgin. Megan Connolly blogged on this case here, on the issue of accounting, and here, on the issue of removal of an estate trustee.

In the May 11/18, 2009 issue of the Law Times, in a comment titled “The duty of an attorney to account”, John O’Sullivan and Lori M. Duffy comment further on the McAllister decision. They note other cases where an attorney for property has been compelled to account to the beneficiaries of an estate after the death of the grantor.

The authors suggest that in light of the duty to account, “the wisest course for a person exercising a power of attorney for property following these decisions is to assume that he or she will be required at some point in the future to account to persons opposed in interest, and to conduct themselves accordingly throughout their tenure as power of attorney.”

The authors go on to suggest that attorneys should, if they can, ensure that the power of attorney document provides protection for the costs that they may be forced to incur in preparing the accounts and passing them before the court.

Thank you for reading,

Paul Trudelle

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The 11^th Annual Estates and Trusts Summit was held in Toronto on November 19 and 20, 2008. This excellent program featured a number of experienced practitioners speaking on a broad array of estates and trusts topics.

Topics (and speakers) included:

• Family Law Update (Karon Bales)
• Shareholder Issues – The Family Business in Succession Planning (Frank Archibald)
• Dealing with Insolvent and Bankrupt Estates (Barry Corbin and Robert Klotz)
• The Non-Resident Factor in Estate Planning (Mary Anne Bueschkens and M. Elena Hoffstein)
• Update on the Trust and Estate Provisions in the Protocol to the Canada/U.S. Income Tax Treaty (Beth Webel and Jim Yager)
• New Strategies for Post-Mortem Tax Planning – The Eligible Dividend Rules and More (Heather Evans)
• Powers of Attorney and the Duty to Account – An Update (Liza Sheard)
• Powers of Appointment (Timothy Youdan)
• The Will is Not the Whole Picture - Integrating the Transfer of Wealth both Inside and Outside the Estate (Wendy Templeton)
• New Developments in Insurance and Estate Planning (Graham Carter)
• Update on Practice Directions for the Estates List (The Honourable Mr. Justice David M. Brown)
• Capacity and Other Issues in Power of Attorney and Guardianship Disputes (Jan Goddard)
• A Clinician’s Perspective on Assessing Testamentary Capacity and Related Capacities (Dr. Kenneth Shulman)
• Capacity Issues – The Perspective of the Hospital, Retirement Home and Group Home (Wendy Griesdorf)
• The Vulnerability of Pre-Death Gifts (Eric Hoffstein)
• The Scope of the Attorney’s Powers (Sender Tator)
• The Incapable Minor Turning 18 (Clare Burns)
• Remarks from the New Children’s Lawyer for the Province of Ontario (Debra Stephens)
• Marshalling the Evidence For and Against Capacity in a Will Challenge (Hilary Laidlaw)
• Short Circuiting the Frivolous Will Challenge (Hull and Hull’s Craig Vander Zee)
• Mediation of Capacity Issues – The Mediator’s Perspective (Felice Kirsh and Archie Rabinowitz)

If you were not able to attend, the seminar materials will be available from the Law Society of Upper Canada.

Thank you for reading,

Paul Trudelle

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Today is the final installment of my discussion of Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.).

After dismissing the will challenge on the basis of due execution, testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval, the court turned to the issue of undue influence. Despite the presence of suspicious circumstances, the court held that the challengers, not the propounder, had the burden of proving undue influence. However, while the son did not have the burden of disproving coercion, his evidence was to be tested against the preponderance of probabilities that rationally emerge out the all the evidence in the case.

The deceased was found to be vulnerable and dependant upon her son for all aspects of her existence. Conversely, the son was found to have an aggressive and domineering personality, both in general and with respect to his desire for absolute ownership of the family holding company.

The court found that the son was very caring of his mother. However, it did not accept his evidence on the issue of undue influence. The court asked a number of rhetorical questions as to why the mother would make the will that she did, despite the circumstances. The court concluded that that will was procured by the undue influence of the son.

The will was therefore found to be invalid.

Paul Trudelle

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Yesterday, I discussed Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.), and the finding of the judge that suspicious circumstances existed, placing the onus back on the propounder to prove testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval.

As to testamentary capacity, the court referred to the oft – quoted decision of Banks v. Goodfellow, and the test for testamentary capacity.

It noted that the capacity required to direct the distribution of one’s estate by Will is “modest”. To be of a sound and disposing mind and memory, a testator must:

1. be aware that they are making a will that takes effect on their death;
2. understand the nature and extent of the estate to be disposed of by Will;
3. be aware of those having a claim to the estate;
4. have no disorder of the mind.

The court reviewed the evidence of the plaintiffs and the witnesses (other than the son) as to testamentary capacity. The court was satisfied that on the preponderance of the evidence, the testator had the necessary capacity to direct the disposition of her estate by will as of the date of the will.

As to knowledge and approval, the court noted that a suspicious circumstances raised in the case required that the son, as the propounder of the will, prove that the deceased knew of and approved of the contents of the will. The court did not accept the evidence of the son to the effect that the deceased had to carefully read her will and discuss it with him on numerous occasions. Despite this, the court concluded that the deceased knew of the provisions of the will that she signed.

To this point, the will survived most of the challenges to it. Will the will be accepted to probate? Can it withstand the final challenge: undue influence? Tune in tomorrow.

Paul Trudelle

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Yesterday, I introduced the will challenge decision of Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.).

After disposing of the issue of due execution, the court turned to the doctrine of “suspicious circumstances”. The court referred to these Supreme Court of Canada decision of Vout v. Hay, where it was held that suspicious circumstances maybe raised by circumstances surrounding the preparation of the will, circumstances tending to call into question the capacity of the testator; or circumstances tending to show that the free will of the testator was overborne by acts of coercion or fraud.

Generally, the propounder of a will has the legal burden with respect to due execution, knowledge and approval, and testamentary capacity. However, upon proof that the will was duly executed, the propounder is aided by the rebuttable presumption that the testator knew and approved of the contents and had the necessary testamentary capacity.

The burden of establishing suspicious circumstances rests on those attacking the will. If evidence can be adduced which, if accepted, would tend to negative knowledge and approval or testamentary capacity, this burden is satisfied and the legal burden reverts to the propounder.

In Hix, it was the son who drafted the challenged will. The Court quoted from Vout v. Hay as follows:

“… if a party writes or prepares a Will, under which he takes a benefit, that is a circumstance that ought generally to excite suspicion of the Court, and calls upon it to be vigilant and jealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument, in favour of which it ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the paper propounded does express the true Will of the deceased.”

The court concluded that the son should never have agreed to draw the will for the deceased. The fact that he did in the circumstances “does more than raise suspicion; it cries out for it.”

Tomorrow: testamentary capacity, and knowledge and approval

Paul Trudelle

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A recent case out of the British Colombia Supreme Court provides an excellent illustration and discussion of various grounds upon which a will can be challenged.

In Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.), the deceased was survived by a son and two daughters. The deceased, the son and the two daughters had varying levels of shareholdings in a holding company.

In a prior will, the deceased left her estate to her three children, equally. In a will drawn January 11, 2004, the deceased left her estate to her three children equally, on the condition that the two daughters transferred their shareholdings in the holding company to the son. The deceased died on June 1, 2006 at the age of 90. The daughters challenged the validity of the will, and the court considered the validity of the will from a number of perspectives.

The court first considered the issue of due execution of the will. The formal requirements necessary to execute a valid will are set out in the relevant legislation. While the court was not prepared to accept the evidence of the son with respect to the execution of the deceased’s will, it did accept the evidence of one of the two witnesses to the will. The court was satisfied that the will was signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses who were present at the same time and who subscribed the will in the presence of each other and the testator.

Court concluded that the will was validly executed. This aspect of the will challenge was rejected.

More tomorrow.

Paul Trudelle

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Collection of legal fees can be an ongoing issue for lawyers. It is certainly an issue for a Chicago lawyer, who faces a 15 month suspension arising out of matters relating to the payment of his fees.

According to a report in the Chicago Tribune, the lawyer provided legal services to a client and members of her family on various matters. The lawyer and the client agreed that the client, an exotic dancer at the time, would perform nude dances for him in his office as a way to cut down on legal fees. The lawyer also received free nude dances at the club where she worked. 

The lawyer credited the client with $534 as against his accounts. 

The client later complained of sexual assault. A grand jury declined to indict the lawyer, but the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, a branch of the state Supreme Court, conducted an investigation leading to the suspension.

Thanks for reading.

Paul Trudelle

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At the October 2007 Hull and Hull Breakfast Seminar, I spoke on the concept of “Mutual Wills”. (See my paper, here.) In a recent decision out of Alberta, the Court again addressed the issue of mutual wills.

In Powell v. Glover, [2008] A.J. No. 961 (Alta. Q.B.)  the deceased and her spouse left wills that specifically provided that the wills were further to an agreement not to revoke or alter the will after the death of one of them. The wills went on to provide that the estate of the first to die was to pass to the surviving spouse. The wills further provided that upon the death of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse’s estate was to pass to named residual beneficiaries, being children of the two spouses from prior marriages.

The husband died in 2003 and his estate passed to his spouse. She took the position that she was the sole beneficiary under her spouse’s will, and that she has no obligation to ensure that upon her death, any residue was to be distributed in accordance with the prior wills.

The Court had little difficulty in finding that the wills were mutual wills. The Court enforced the agreement between the spouses not to vary from the prior distribution agreement made while both spouses were alive. The surviving spouse’s estate (upon her death) was charged with a trust in favour of the residual beneficiaries of the mutual wills.

The fact that the surviving spouse was still alive did not make the Application premature.

The more difficult issue was what property was charged with the trust. The Court found that the trust would apply to all property acquired by the surviving spouse upon the death of the first spouse. The surviving spouse is allowed to deal with the property she acquired from the other during her lifetime, but is not entitled to divest her property intentionally in order to avoid the terms of the mutual will.

Paul Trudelle

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While I was in Court in Toronto on Friday, Mr. Justice Brown advised the court room in general that with respect to most Orders Giving Directions granted by him (and possibly other judges on the Estates List), the Order Giving Directions will include a Schedule that provides that the Applicant is to file with the Estates Office a tabbed, three ring, red 1” binder labelled “Endorsements/Orders Brief”, which is to be maintained as part of the record of the proceeding. Within five days after the making of any endorsement or Order in the proceeding, the Applicant is to file a copy of such endorsement or Order in the next available tab in the Brief.

Mr. Justice Brown observed that the purpose of such a Brief is to allow the presiding Judge on any subsequent hearing date to quickly determine the history of the proceeding, and all judicial determinations made to date.

The Schedule also provides that Factums are to be filed on all subsequent motions.

The utility of such a Brief and the requirement to file a Factum appears obvious. The requirements to create the Brief and to file a Factum will clearly assist the Court in determining the history of the proceeding, and allowing for the prompt and efficient determination of the matter before it.

Thank you for reading.

Paul Trudelle

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Following up on Allan Socken’s blog of March 31, 2008 entitled “What is Legacy Coaching”, I came across an article in the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Journal entitled “Is Your (Ethical) Will in Order?” (2008) 33 ACTEC Journal 154 by Zoe Hicks. In her article, the author reviews what an Ethical Will is, what types of topics are normally covered, the format of the Ethical Will, and how estate planning practitioners have embraced the concept of advising clients with respect to leaving an Ethical Will.

Essentially, an Ethical Will is a testament of what you want your survivors to know, rather than what material assets you want them to have. Ethical Wills can include expressions of wisdom, values and beliefs of the “testator”, reminders of heritage, apologies, explanations of actions taken or not taken, regrets, expressions of love and gratitude, and words of encouragement.

Ms. Hicks sets out numerous extracts from Ethical Wills so that the reader can get a flavour of the types of matters that an Ethical Will can to address. She concludes by observing that an Ethical Will can be a valuable exercise for both the writer and the recipient.

For more information, read her article, or visit www.ethicalwill.com. This site explains the concept, and provides several examples of Ethical Wills in different forms. 

Have a great weekend.

Paul Trudelle

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On April 23, 2008, I attended at the Ontario Bar Association’s Dinner with the Estates Lists Justices.

The evening began with a review of the Case of the Month by Barry Corbin. Barry discussed the Court of Appeal decision of Madore-Ogilvie v. Ogilvie Estate (This case was also discussed by Sean Graham and Rick Bickhram in Hull on Estates, Episode #103.) This case dealt with the inclusion of jointly owned insurance polices as “section 72” assets under the Succession Law Reform Act.

Following Barry’s excellent presentation, Madam Justice Allen, Madam Justice Conway and Mr. Justice Brown took to the dais. They discussed various ways that the bar can work with the bench in order to facilitate the decision-making process, while advocating the client’s position.

Practical tips include organizing the court file, filing meaningful confirmation forms, attending with a working draft of the Order Giving Directions, and filing chronologies and lists of beneficiaries were appropriate.

The importance of filing a Factum was emphasized. These are said to be extremely helpful, and not filing a Factum should be an exception rather than the norm. 

More tomorrow.

Paul Trudelle

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Mom dies, leaving a will that divides her estate among her three sons. The only trouble is that before she died, Mom gave the farm to one of her sons. Accordingly, the other two sons receive nothing upon Mom’s death. 

This fact situation was recently considered by Jenkins J. in Bale v. Bale.

The two disappointed sons were not actively involved in Mom's care. The other son lived with Mom, and helped her extensively. The court found that Mom relied on the one son for her care and well being.

The lawyer on the transfer said that Mom, who was 93, understood the transaction and what she was signing. A doctor confirmed her capacity.

Notwithstanding this capacity, the judge concluded that the relationship between Mom and son was one of dependency. The presumption of undue influence was triggered. Although the court found that Mom had great affection for her one son, this was not sufficient to validate the transfer of the property to him. The court concluded that the transfer of the farm was influenced by Mom’s dependence on the one son. The transfer was set aside.

When considering the value of an estate, one should consider any transfers by the deceased prior to his or her death; particularly where any such transfer might have resulted from undue influence due to a dependency.

Thank you for reading

Paul Trudelle

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In determining whether to litigate, or how far to go with a claim, a paramount consideration must be the costs involved, and the prospect of their recovery or payment.

Recently, I came across a case that highlights the issue. There, a wrongful dismissal matter, the court awarded the employee 2 ½ months’ notice, or $9,166. However, in the costs ruling, the judge noted that the employee’s own costs, according to the employee’s bill of costs, were $14,246. (Actual costs incurred by a client are often in excess of the costs claimed in a bill of costs.) The judge, for various reasons, did not award any costs to any party.

There are a myriad of other examples.

There is also the old joke about the man who said he only went bankrupt twice: once when he lost a lawsuit, and once when he won.

Parties often state that it is the “principle” of the matter that warrants the fight. However, “principles” come with a cost, and this reality must always be kept in mind.

Parties to a piece of litigation must be aware of these costs, and these costs should inform, to a considerable extent, the actions of the parties. Hopefully, all parties will take reasonable approaches in light of the costs of proceeding to court.

This, however, is easier said than done, particularly in the context of estate litigation. Here, emotions are usually close to the surface, and often interfere with reasonable judgment. One of the functions of the litigation lawyer is to attempt to calm these emotions, and to bring a reasoned, objective vision to the table.

Thank you for reading,

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It’s just about tax time, so I thought I would briefly discuss the taxation of executor compensation.

The basic premise is that executor compensation is taxable in the hands of the recipient. It is either income from an office or employment (if the executor is not in the business of being an executor) or income from a business (if the executor is in the business of being an executor, or if such a function is in the executor’s usual course of business). Various consequences flow from the distinction, such as allowable deductions, and withholding requirements for EI and CPP.

CRA takes this obligation to report executor compensation quite seriously. An example of the lengths to which CRA will go is found in the decision of Oolup v. The Queen. There, Ms. Oolup, the executor held a joint account with her grandmother, the deceased. She was advised by her lawyer that upon the death of the deceased, the joint account became hers, by right of survivorship. However, for “reasons of family harmony”, she decided to keep only $10,000 from the joint account, and divided the rest with the deceased’s next of kin.

CRA took the position that the $10,000 was executor compensation, and was therefore taxable, and they assessed Ms. Oolup accordingly. To get to this point, they argued that the joint account was held on a resulting trust for the estate. The CRA argued that the presumption of resulting trust applied, and was not rebutted. Accordingly, they asserted that Ms. Oolup received the $10,000 from the estate, as executor compensation.

Luckily for Ms. Oolup, she was able to rebut the presumption, and the court found that the joint account funds became her property upon the death of the deceased. She received the money by right of survivorship. Therefore, her keeping $10,000 was not receipt of compensation by her, and was not to be included in her income.

Thank you for reading,

Paul Trudelle