Ms. Wolfe tells of Mark Gruenwald, a Marvel Comics writer, who in his will directed that his ashes be mixed with ink and used within the pages of a comic book. 4,000 “ink and ashes” issues of Squadron Supreme were produced after his death.

She tells of Portuguese aristocrat Luis Carlos de Noronha Cabral da Camara, who picked 70 random strangers from a Lisbon telephone book as his beneficiaries.

She tells of Onni Nurmi, a Finish businessman who left 780 shares of a rubber boot company to residents of a Finish nursing home. The company went on to become Nokia, and the residents became millionaires. (Another report, here, says that the bequest wasn’t to the residents, but to the town of Pukkila for the “recreation of the people living in the village’s old people’s home”. At one point, the shares were said to be worth $90m.)

In my personal favourite, she tells of Anthony Scott, who wrote in his will: “To my first wife, Sue, whom I always promised to mention in my will. Hello Sue!”

Ms. Wolfe concludes by reciting the saying: “The person who works and saves will someday have enough wealth to divide with those who don’t.”

Visit her web page to see the entire article, and browse other articles by her.

Have a great weekend.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

The issue of mutual wills was front and centre in the July 26, 2010 decision of Re Hand Estate, 2010 NSSC 297 (CanLII).

There, Dr. Hand and Ms. Hand prepared wills in 1999. In his will, Dr. Hand conveyed a condominium to his son Richard if Ms. Hand was to predecease him (the condo was jointly owned with Ms. Hand). In Ms. Hand’s will, she provides that the condo is to go to Richard. Because of the joint ownership, this gift would fail if Ms. Hand was to predecease Dr. Hand, as the condo would pass to Dr. Hand by right of survivorship.

Ms. Hand predeceased Dr. Hand. The condo passed to Dr. Hand. Dr. Hand then revised his will, leaving most of his property to a daughter. He also transferred the condo into a trust.

Richard cried foul, arguing that the wills were mutual wills and therefore were subject to an agreement against revocation. Accordingly, he argued that he was entitled to a half interest in the condo.

The court disagreed. The court found that the wills were not “mutual”, and further, there was no agreement against revocation.

As to the first point, the court found that the different terms of the two wills meant that they could not meet the definition of “mutual wills”, which required that the wills contain reciprocal provisions.

Further, the different terms of the will suggested that there was no such agreement, and that the “flexible norm of revocability” applied. 

This conclusion was supported by evidence from the drafting solicitor, who advised Dr. Hand and Ms. Hand that upon the death of the first of them, the condo would pass to the other as the sole owner. This, the court held, raised the issue of freedom of the sole owner to do as he wishes with his property.

Subsequent events did not assist Richard. The fact that for a number of years after Ms. Hand’s death, Dr. Hand continued to provide that the condo would pass to Richard suggested, at most, that the intention remained. It did not provide evidence of a mutual agreement against revocation.

While the court is free to find an implied agreement not to revoke a will, the court will not do so except in the clearest of cases. If parties intend to create mutual wills, with the accompanying agreement not to subsequently revoke the wills, they should do so in the clearest of express terms.

Thank you for reading.

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This issue was considered in Clarke v. Di Bella, 2010 BCSC 505 (CanLII).

There, the testator made a Will that provided that until the death of the survivor of the testator or A, the Estate was to pay the income and capital, as the trustees may decide, to A. Upon A’s death, the residue was to be divided amongst B, C and D. If any of B, C or D was to predecease A leaving children, then that person’s share would go to their children.

A decided to renounce her gift, and have the residue pass to B, C and D immediately. That is, the gift to B, C and D would be accelerated.

The Public Guardian and Trustee opposed, taking the position that acceleration of the gift was contrary to the intentions of the testator, and that acceleration would disentitle the children of B, C and D from a possible inheritance.

The Court disagreed with the PGT’s position, and allowed the acceleration. It held that from a review of the case law, there were four clear principles that applied:

a.                  Acceleration is presumed unless there is an indication to the contrary;

b.                  In assessing whether there is an intention to the contrary, the court must look at both the instrument and the surrounding circumstances;

c.                  The instrument must be examined in its entirety, and clauses must not be examined in isolation; and

d.                  The intentions must be viewed, as nearly as possible, from what would be the views of the testatrix, applying an objective standard.

While many cases have disallowed acceleration, the court did not feel that the present circumstances prevented acceleration.

The court did, however, agree that the intention of the testatrix was that no beneficiary would receive a bequest before the age of 25, and imposed a restriction on distribution before the beneficiaries turned 25.

Thank you for reading.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

The National Post recently reported on a man and a woman who had been living together for a number of years and had won $50,000 on a scratch-and-win ticket. The ticket had been purchased by the man. Notwithstanding the fact that the couple had previously shared winnings, the winnings were deposited into a joint account, and part of the winnings were used for a down payment on a property that they both owned, the court found that there was no prior agreement to share the winnings.

(In another recent Ontario case, the judge found that in absence of cogent evidence of a clear intent to share winnings, there will be no requirement to share.)

Had the couple been married, there would have been a presumption that the lottery winnings were joint.

In Ontario, s. 14 of the Family Law Act creates a presumption that in the case of married spouses, the fact that property is held in the names of spouses as joint tenants is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the spouses intended to own the property as joint tenants, and money on deposit in the name of both spouses shall be deemed to be in the name of the spouses as joint tenants. The provision does not apply to common-law spouses.

What are the possible lessons from this?

1. If you are buying lottery tickets with someone else, be they a friend or unmarried spouse, have some agreement in place to share the winnings.
2. As Beyonce says, if you liked it, then you should have put a ring on it.

Thank you for reading.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

Earlier, Diane Vieira blogged here on the estate of the best-selling author, who died in 2004. Diane noted that Larsson’s common-law spouse of over 30 years received nothing from Larsson’s estate. Larsson died without a valid will, and his estate, estimated presently as having a value of $30 million, passed on an intestacy to his father and brother. Under Sweden’s inheritance laws, the common-law spouse received nothing, and did not have a claim against the estate.

In a lengthy New York Times Magazine article entitled “The Afterlife of Stieg Larsson”, Charles McGrath reports in detail on the life and events subsequent to the death of Larsson.

McGrath notes that Larsson died without a valid Will. (Apparently, Larrson did leave a 1977 will, in which he leaves his estate to the Socialist Party in Umea: the will was not witnessed and is said to have no legal validity.) Although his long-time companion, Eva Gabrielsson, received nothing from his estate, she has become an object of intense sympathy in Sweden.

Gabrielsson also has a laptop containing ¾ of a fourth novel by Larrson, and possibly an outline for others. Larsson’s estate offered to give her their half of Larsson’s apartment in exchange for the computer, but Gabriellson refused. Last November, the estate apparently offered her $2.6 million for the computer, but Gabrielsson didn’t respond.

McGrath states that while Gabrielsson has no claim, she has asserted “a kind of moral entitlement”. In a National Post article, Gabrielsson is said to be claiming that she co-authored the books.

As is usual in these types of matters, great animosity has developed between the spouse and the estate.

Thank you for reading.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

The court had dismissed the application by the charity for a declaration that it was the successor charity, or that it was entitled to the bequest upon the application of the cy-pres doctrine.

The charity requested solicitor and client costs from the estate. The successful residual beneficiaries suggested that the charity should receive no costs at all, or at best, party and party costs. The residual beneficiaries noted that any award of costs would come from their entitlement under the estate, and thus, in effect, the successful parties would be paying the unsuccessful party’s costs.

The court awarded solicitor and client costs to the charity. The court noted that the “dispute” was created less by the parties, and more by the wording used by the testator, which wording “fuelled” the issues. Although the arguments of the charity failed, they were “justified” arguments, and arguments “based on reason”.

In Ontario, the court has made similar costs rulings in circumstances where it can be said that the parties have acted reasonably in bringing the matter before the court. However, a different outcome might result if the court was of the view that one of the parties acted unreasonably.

Thank you for reading.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

However, at the time of his death (or at the time of the making of the Will, for that matter), there was no entity known as the “Heritage Society of Bedford”. There was a charity known as the “Bedford Heritage Society”. However, that charity disposed of its assets and surrendered its certificate of incorporation many years earlier.

The Fort Sackville Foundation claimed that it was the successor charity. The court rejected this claim, holding that there was no amalgamation. While the court will take a broad approach to legal successorship in such circumstances, it cannot find a successor where an entity ceased to exist.

The court went on to consider whether the doctrine of cy-pres applied. The doctrine will be applied where:

a.      the gift as it stands is either impossible or impractical to effect; and

b.      the donor expressed a general charitable intent in making the gift.

The court held that neither test had been met. 

As to the first branch of the test, the gift was not impossible or impractical to effect. Because the gift provided for a gift-over, it could readily be given effect.

As to the second branch, the conditions of the gift narrowed the focus of the gift so as to take away a general charitable intent. The purpose of the gift was to preserve the deceased’s property. If that could not be done, the proceeds were to pass to the residual beneficiaries. Thus, it was held that there was no general charitable intent.

As a result, the proceeds of the sale passed to the residual beneficiaries.

See here for the reported decision.

Tomorrow, I will turn to the issue of costs.

Thank you for reading.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

Queen Victoria was born on May 24, 1819, and died on January 22, 1901. She became Queen at the age of 18, and reigned as monarch for over 63 years, being the longest reigning monarch in history. She had 9 children (she was predeceased by 3 of her children), including her successor to the throne, Edward VII.

Unfortunately, very little information can be found online about Queen Victoria’s Will. However, while searching, I discovered that a legacy of sorts was recently sold at auction in Scotland. Queen Victoria’s stockings (circa 1870) were sold earlier this year for 8,000 pounds (about $12,000 CDN).                                                    

The prior owner, Mary Youings, said that her late mother gained possession of the stockings around 1910. She said that she did not know the circumstances of how her mother gained possession of the stockings. The Telegraph reported that upon Queen Victoria’s death, her undergarments and much of her wardrobe were distributed to members of the royal household.

In July, 2008, Youings sold a pair of Queen Victoria’s 50” waist bloomers for 4,500 pounds.

I hope you enjoyed your Victoria Day Weekend, and got a “leg up” on summer.

Paul E. Trudelle - Click here for more information on Paul Trudelle.

According to the harmonized sales tax, funeral services will now be taxed at the rate of 13%, up from 5%. The effect on a $5,000 funeral would be to raise the tax payable from $250 to $650.

The new harmonized tax may also have an effect on prepaid funeral services. According to a May 27, 2009 Toronto Star article, there are 224,257 prepaid funeral contracts in Ontario, and about 1 in 4 funerals in Ontario are prepaid.

The Ontario Minister of Finance has indicated that the government hopes to implement some sort of grandfathering clause, so that funeral services prepaid before a certain date remain exempted from the PST. However, nothing has been finalized yet. The cut-off date would likely be some time before July 1, 2010.

Those considering a prepaid funeral would be wise to complete their plans sooner rather than later. The new tax, like death, is approaching.

Thank you for reading.

Paul Trudelle

In the May 11/18, 2009 issue of the Law Times, in a comment titled “The duty of an attorney to account”, John O’Sullivan and Lori M. Duffy comment further on the McAllister decision. They note other cases where an attorney for property has been compelled to account to the beneficiaries of an estate after the death of the grantor.

The authors suggest that in light of the duty to account, “the wisest course for a person exercising a power of attorney for property following these decisions is to assume that he or she will be required at some point in the future to account to persons opposed in interest, and to conduct themselves accordingly throughout their tenure as power of attorney.”

The authors go on to suggest that attorneys should, if they can, ensure that the power of attorney document provides protection for the costs that they may be forced to incur in preparing the accounts and passing them before the court.

Thank you for reading,

Paul Trudelle

Topics (and speakers) included:

• Family Law Update (Karon Bales)
• Shareholder Issues – The Family Business in Succession Planning (Frank Archibald)
• Dealing with Insolvent and Bankrupt Estates (Barry Corbin and Robert Klotz)
• The Non-Resident Factor in Estate Planning (Mary Anne Bueschkens and M. Elena Hoffstein)
• Update on the Trust and Estate Provisions in the Protocol to the Canada/U.S. Income Tax Treaty (Beth Webel and Jim Yager)
• New Strategies for Post-Mortem Tax Planning – The Eligible Dividend Rules and More (Heather Evans)
• Powers of Attorney and the Duty to Account – An Update (Liza Sheard)
• Powers of Appointment (Timothy Youdan)
• The Will is Not the Whole Picture - Integrating the Transfer of Wealth both Inside and Outside the Estate (Wendy Templeton)
• New Developments in Insurance and Estate Planning (Graham Carter)
• Update on Practice Directions for the Estates List (The Honourable Mr. Justice David M. Brown)
• Capacity and Other Issues in Power of Attorney and Guardianship Disputes (Jan Goddard)
• A Clinician’s Perspective on Assessing Testamentary Capacity and Related Capacities (Dr. Kenneth Shulman)
• Capacity Issues – The Perspective of the Hospital, Retirement Home and Group Home (Wendy Griesdorf)
• The Vulnerability of Pre-Death Gifts (Eric Hoffstein)
• The Scope of the Attorney’s Powers (Sender Tator)
• The Incapable Minor Turning 18 (Clare Burns)
• Remarks from the New Children’s Lawyer for the Province of Ontario (Debra Stephens)
• Marshalling the Evidence For and Against Capacity in a Will Challenge (Hilary Laidlaw)
• Short Circuiting the Frivolous Will Challenge (Hull and Hull’s Craig Vander Zee)
• Mediation of Capacity Issues – The Mediator’s Perspective (Felice Kirsh and Archie Rabinowitz)

If you were not able to attend, the seminar materials will be available from the Law Society of Upper Canada.

Thank you for reading,

Paul Trudelle

Today is the final installment of my discussion of Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.).

After dismissing the will challenge on the basis of due execution, testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval, the court turned to the issue of undue influence. Despite the presence of suspicious circumstances, the court held that the challengers, not the propounder, had the burden of proving undue influence. However, while the son did not have the burden of disproving coercion, his evidence was to be tested against the preponderance of probabilities that rationally emerge out the all the evidence in the case.

The deceased was found to be vulnerable and dependant upon her son for all aspects of her existence. Conversely, the son was found to have an aggressive and domineering personality, both in general and with respect to his desire for absolute ownership of the family holding company.

The court found that the son was very caring of his mother. However, it did not accept his evidence on the issue of undue influence. The court asked a number of rhetorical questions as to why the mother would make the will that she did, despite the circumstances. The court concluded that that will was procured by the undue influence of the son.

The will was therefore found to be invalid.

Paul Trudelle

Yesterday, I discussed Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.), and the finding of the judge that suspicious circumstances existed, placing the onus back on the propounder to prove testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval.

As to testamentary capacity, the court referred to the oft – quoted decision of Banks v. Goodfellow, and the test for testamentary capacity.

It noted that the capacity required to direct the distribution of one’s estate by Will is “modest”. To be of a sound and disposing mind and memory, a testator must:

1. be aware that they are making a will that takes effect on their death;
2. understand the nature and extent of the estate to be disposed of by Will;
3. be aware of those having a claim to the estate;
4. have no disorder of the mind.

The court reviewed the evidence of the plaintiffs and the witnesses (other than the son) as to testamentary capacity. The court was satisfied that on the preponderance of the evidence, the testator had the necessary capacity to direct the disposition of her estate by will as of the date of the will.

As to knowledge and approval, the court noted that a suspicious circumstances raised in the case required that the son, as the propounder of the will, prove that the deceased knew of and approved of the contents of the will. The court did not accept the evidence of the son to the effect that the deceased had to carefully read her will and discuss it with him on numerous occasions. Despite this, the court concluded that the deceased knew of the provisions of the will that she signed.

To this point, the will survived most of the challenges to it. Will the will be accepted to probate? Can it withstand the final challenge: undue influence? Tune in tomorrow.

Paul Trudelle

After disposing of the issue of due execution, the court turned to the doctrine of “suspicious circumstances”. The court referred to these Supreme Court of Canada decision of Vout v. Hay, where it was held that suspicious circumstances maybe raised by circumstances surrounding the preparation of the will, circumstances tending to call into question the capacity of the testator; or circumstances tending to show that the free will of the testator was overborne by acts of coercion or fraud.

Generally, the propounder of a will has the legal burden with respect to due execution, knowledge and approval, and testamentary capacity. However, upon proof that the will was duly executed, the propounder is aided by the rebuttable presumption that the testator knew and approved of the contents and had the necessary testamentary capacity.

The burden of establishing suspicious circumstances rests on those attacking the will. If evidence can be adduced which, if accepted, would tend to negative knowledge and approval or testamentary capacity, this burden is satisfied and the legal burden reverts to the propounder.

In Hix, it was the son who drafted the challenged will. The Court quoted from Vout v. Hay as follows:

“… if a party writes or prepares a Will, under which he takes a benefit, that is a circumstance that ought generally to excite suspicion of the Court, and calls upon it to be vigilant and jealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument, in favour of which it ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the paper propounded does express the true Will of the deceased.”

The court concluded that the son should never have agreed to draw the will for the deceased. The fact that he did in the circumstances “does more than raise suspicion; it cries out for it.”

Tomorrow: testamentary capacity, and knowledge and approval

Paul Trudelle

In Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.), the deceased was survived by a son and two daughters. The deceased, the son and the two daughters had varying levels of shareholdings in a holding company.

In a prior will, the deceased left her estate to her three children, equally. In a will drawn January 11, 2004, the deceased left her estate to her three children equally, on the condition that the two daughters transferred their shareholdings in the holding company to the son. The deceased died on June 1, 2006 at the age of 90. The daughters challenged the validity of the will, and the court considered the validity of the will from a number of perspectives.

The court first considered the issue of due execution of the will. The formal requirements necessary to execute a valid will are set out in the relevant legislation. While the court was not prepared to accept the evidence of the son with respect to the execution of the deceased’s will, it did accept the evidence of one of the two witnesses to the will. The court was satisfied that the will was signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses who were present at the same time and who subscribed the will in the presence of each other and the testator.

Court concluded that the will was validly executed. This aspect of the will challenge was rejected.

More tomorrow.

Paul Trudelle

According to a report in the Chicago Tribune, the lawyer provided legal services to a client and members of her family on various matters. The lawyer and the client agreed that the client, an exotic dancer at the time, would perform nude dances for him in his office as a way to cut down on legal fees. The lawyer also received free nude dances at the club where she worked. 

The lawyer credited the client with $534 as against his accounts. 

The client later complained of sexual assault. A grand jury declined to indict the lawyer, but the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, a branch of the state Supreme Court, conducted an investigation leading to the suspension.

Thanks for reading.

Paul Trudelle

In Powell v. Glover, [2008] A.J. No. 961 (Alta. Q.B.)  the deceased and her spouse left wills that specifically provided that the wills were further to an agreement not to revoke or alter the will after the death of one of them. The wills went on to provide that the estate of the first to die was to pass to the surviving spouse. The wills further provided that upon the death of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse’s estate was to pass to named residual beneficiaries, being children of the two spouses from prior marriages.

The husband died in 2003 and his estate passed to his spouse. She took the position that she was the sole beneficiary under her spouse’s will, and that she has no obligation to ensure that upon her death, any residue was to be distributed in accordance with the prior wills.

The Court had little difficulty in finding that the wills were mutual wills. The Court enforced the agreement between the spouses not to vary from the prior distribution agreement made while both spouses were alive. The surviving spouse’s estate (upon her death) was charged with a trust in favour of the residual beneficiaries of the mutual wills.

The fact that the surviving spouse was still alive did not make the Application premature.

The more difficult issue was what property was charged with the trust. The Court found that the trust would apply to all property acquired by the surviving spouse upon the death of the first spouse. The surviving spouse is allowed to deal with the property she acquired from the other during her lifetime, but is not entitled to divest her property intentionally in order to avoid the terms of the mutual will.

Paul Trudelle

Mr. Justice Brown observed that the purpose of such a Brief is to allow the presiding Judge on any subsequent hearing date to quickly determine the history of the proceeding, and all judicial determinations made to date.

The Schedule also provides that Factums are to be filed on all subsequent motions.

The utility of such a Brief and the requirement to file a Factum appears obvious. The requirements to create the Brief and to file a Factum will clearly assist the Court in determining the history of the proceeding, and allowing for the prompt and efficient determination of the matter before it.

Thank you for reading.

Paul Trudelle

Essentially, an Ethical Will is a testament of what you want your survivors to know, rather than what material assets you want them to have. Ethical Wills can include expressions of wisdom, values and beliefs of the “testator”, reminders of heritage, apologies, explanations of actions taken or not taken, regrets, expressions of love and gratitude, and words of encouragement.

Ms. Hicks sets out numerous extracts from Ethical Wills so that the reader can get a flavour of the types of matters that an Ethical Will can to address. She concludes by observing that an Ethical Will can be a valuable exercise for both the writer and the recipient.

For more information, read her article, or visit www.ethicalwill.com. This site explains the concept, and provides several examples of Ethical Wills in different forms. 

Have a great weekend.

Paul Trudelle