Proprietary Estoppel - Hull on Estates #92

Listen to Proprietary Estoppel

This week on Hull on Estates, David Smith and Rick Bickhram discuss proprietary estoppel.

Proprietary Estoppel - Hull on Estates Podcast #92

Posted on January 8th, 2008 by Hull & Hull LLP

 

David Smith:  Hello and welcome to Hull on Estates.  You’re listening to Episode #92 of our continuing podcast series on Tuesday, January 8th, 2008.

 

Welcome to Hull on Estates, a series of podcasts for the Canadian legal community dealing with issues and insights surrounding estate planning in Canada.   Hosted by the lawyers of Hull & Hull, the podcast will touch on some key considerations when planning estates and Wills.  Now, here are today’s hosts.

 

David Smith:  Good morning Rick.

 

Rick Bickhram:  Good morning Dave.

 

David Smith:  My name is David Smith.  I’m one of the partners at Hull & Hull.  And I’m here today with my associate, Rick Bickhram.  And today, Rick, we thought we’d talk about an interesting equitable concept which is gaining considerable traction in a lot of the cases that we look at, and certainly is an established concept in the British estates Bar.  And that, of course, is this whole issue of proprietary estoppel and when it can be used.  Rick, just generally speaking, what is proprietary estoppel?

 

Rick Bickhram:  Good question, Dave.  The doctrine of proprietary estoppel is primarily used by a claimant who has been promised all or part of an estate and has acted to his or her detriment in reliance on that promise.

 

David Smith:  So that’s really a classic equitable concept, isn’t it?  It’s where the Court is looking to fashion a remedy based on principles of fairness, when you boil it down, and principles of equity, to correct a situation which it would be unjust to leave as is.  And, of course, in the estate context, we’re always looking initially at the Will.  And I assume, Rick, that the situation where this arises is where someone’s been promised an inheritance in an estate by a testator and then subsequently discovers that they’re not receiving that inheritance?

 

Rick Bickhram:  That is correct, Dave.

 

David Smith:  Now Rick, this…I want to flesh this whole concept out a little bit more.  How does it differ from promissory estoppel, which is a term that we encounter in other areas of civil litigation?

 

Rick Bickhram:  Great question, Dave.  A promissory estoppel is pretty similar to the definition of proprietary estoppel.  If we look at the textbook definition of promissory estoppel, a claimant can rely on promissory estoppel where there is a clear promise by the deceased, and that promise affected their legal relationship and the promisee or representee acted to his or her detriment.  The difference between proprietary estoppel and promissory estoppel is that proprietary estoppel can be used as a sword and shield.  Proprietary estoppel can give rise to a cause of action.  Whereas promissory estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action.

 

David Smith:  Okay.  And that’s really critical, isn’t it, for us, as litigation lawyers, isn’t it, Rick?  I mean, we’re always looking for opportunities to advance claims and defend or advance our clients’ interests.  And I think in a situation where…the classic example is someone’s cut out of a Will.  Well, were they relatives?  Were they…did they have an expectation of receiving a benefit?  The first thing we always tend to look at is, is there a Will challenge here, and is there a benefit to challenging a Will?  But in a lot of these cases where proprietary estoppel is useful, there’s a couple of points.  One is, the Will may not be one that can be challenged in any event because it may be a perfectly valid Will.  And the other problem may be that the person who rendered services to the deceased may not be a beneficiary under a prior Will, in which case, there’s no benefit to advancing a Will challenge in any event.  And so when we go through the flow chart of decisions or possible remedies available to any client, and we come to the conclusion that a Will challenge is not a viable option, in these circumstances we then look to other options.  And certainly, you know, proprietary estoppel is related to the concepts of quantum meruit, constructive trust, all of those other kinds of remedies that are a little better known in the Ontario Court system.  Proprietary estoppel is simply another means by which we can rely on the Court of equity to correct an injustice.  And that’s it at its highest.  But if we boil it down to its various components, Rick, what’s the first and most pivotal element of a proprietary estoppel claim?

 

Rick Bickhram:  Well, the first element of a proprietary estoppel claim is that the claimant must have incurred an expenditure or otherwise have prejudiced himself or herself or has acted to his or her detriment.

 

David Smith:  What’s an example of that, Rick?

 

Rick Bickhram:  Well, for instance, if the deceased represented to the claimant that if the claimant had built a road, she would leave them one third of her estate.  The claimant then built the road in reliance on that representation and the claimant is able to verify or back that up with corroborating evidence, then I think that satisfies the first element that he acted to his detriment by building that road and prejudiced himself as a result of the deceased’s representations.

 

David Smith:  And let’s pick up on this acting to your detriment or prejudicing yourself concept.  I mean, to my mind, any time you act to your detriment or prejudice yourself, you’re basically saying look, I spent time doing something for you, mister testator, that ate into time that I could otherwise spend doing something else.  So instead of investing in the stock market in my spare time as a day trader, I spent my time working for you because I understood that you were going to give me an entitlement.  I relied upon that to my detriment.  And my reliance was reasonable, right Rick?  Isn’t that a pretty key component of this?

 

Rick Bickhram:  Oh, that’s very important, and a good point, Dave.  And I guess as a general rule of thumb, your expectation should always have some type of benchmark where it can be considered reasonable from an objective point of view.

 

David Smith:  And so, of course, that brings us to the question of proof which we’ll talk about in a minute.  But if we think about, again, the equitable concept here.  On the one hand, you’ve got the innocent, naïve if you will, worker bee doing all of this work for the benefit of the testator.  And on the other hand, there’s a bit of a value judgment about the testator in the sense that if the person doing the services relies…reasonably relies…on representations made, and if the testator breaches the arrangement, then really it’s a bit of a damning indictment, isn’t it, of the testator who leads the promisee to expect an entitlement which he or she doesn’t receive.

 

Rick Bickhram:  And I guess that’s why it’s sort of an equitable remedy.  There is no formal contract.  It sounds like a contract, but there is no actual written document.  And that’s why we ask that the Court of equity step in here and correct the injustice that has been done by the testator’s breach.

 

David Smith:  As I understand it, too, Rick, the third component that we think about is that we have to obviously deal with proving this.  We have to prove that the testator encouraged the promisee to do the work which was done, and the testator must have known of the work incurred or the expenditure incurred, and consciously made a decision not to honour the equitable obligation to provide a benefit.

 

Rick Bickhram:  Absolutely, Dave.  And it’s interesting that you say that, because there is a case, a 2006 decision by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, wherein the claimant here had built a causeway across an island that was owned by the deceased.  The deceased had promised the claimant here, the son, that he would receive an interest in that island if he had built the causeway. Now, during the deceased’s lifetime, she attended her solicitor’s office.  While at her solicitor’s office, she put the deed, or put an interest of the island into her two other children’s.  So not the claimant.  She put it into her daughter’s name and to her other son’s name.  The Courts, in the situation…well the claimant brought an action on the grounds of proprietary estoppel.  And the Courts here dismissed Ronald’s claim.  And the reason for dismissing Ronald’s claim was because there was insufficient evidence.  Ronald, who was the deceased’s son, the claimant here, he was unable to demonstrate that the deceased had promised him the island and he had built the causeway because of that promise.  Primarily what he was…or the evidence that the Court was looking for…was some form of corroboration of the alleged promise.  And the only evidence that the claimant, Ronald, had in this situation, was his own evidence.

 

David Smith:  And let’s finish up the podcast, Rick, by talking about evidence.  You know, Section 13 of the Evidence Act, requires corroboration in claims made against estates, for the very good reason that unless there is corroboration, it’s open to unscrupulous plaintiffs to advance claims which may be completely without merit.  Of course, there’s lots of good claims where regrettably there is no corroborating evidence.  And it would seem, given the rigidity of Section 13 of the Evidence Act, that those are unfortunately situations where the Court quite likely will be compelled to reject the claim if there’s no corroborative evidence.

 

In terms of the kind of corroboration we look for, obviously paper is the best thing we can have.  If there’s any kind of paper which evidences the nature of the arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant, it’s really good to have something of that nature.  I might point out also that there’s other cases that you can have where you might be able to argue proprietary estoppel.  A case that comes to mind is one in which a deceased, during his lifetime, befriends a woman late in life.  She’s younger in age, she comes in and agrees to live with him as husband and wife.  He buys her an engagement ring, although he never actually marries her.  And when he dies, leaves her out of the Will.  Now, of course, other remedies would be available to someone in that case.  She’d be able to advance, presumably, a support claim under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.  Although consider a case where she lived in a relationship with him as a common-law spouse for less than 3 years.  In that case, she couldn’t make a claim as a spouse, she wouldn’t get a benefit under the Will or on an intestacy rather, because she’s not married to him.  And so this would be an interesting instance where proprietary estoppel would be an attractive remedy because the argument would be that she acted to her detriment in reliance upon a promise, the promise being that he would marry her.  And by not marrying her, she lost any entitlement that she would otherwise have on an intestacy.  And so there, from an evidentiary point of view, you can see that the engagement ring, evidence of friends as to how he treated her and whether he introduced her as his wife to others.  Those witnesses would obviously be relevant and would corroborate the intention to provide her with some benefit.

 

Rick Bickhram:  That’s a great point, Dave.

 

David Smith:  One other point from an evidentiary point of view, just to wrap it up, Rick, is an issue where there may be a prior Will that’s unsigned, which benefits the person who then renders the services.  That Will is of no value on a Will challenge, but it’s very valuable evidence to corroborate the later intention to benefit the person who renders the services.

 

Rick, do you have any other thoughts before we wrap up in terms of the kind of evidence we’d want to look for?

 

Rick Bickhram:  As you said earlier on, paper evidence is absolutely great.  We could always use that, or lawyers in general could use that, in demonstrating the testator’s intent at one point.  Also it would be helpful if there was some type of witness, if there were witnesses that were unbiased, who could give or account for a promise or an assurance that the testator once…or that the testator had put out for the person who was using proprietary estoppel.

 

David Smith:  All good points, Rick.  And certainly I think we’ve touched on this topic.  It’s an interesting topic.  There’s lots more we can say about it obviously but it’s been a lot of fun and we’ll look forward to podcasting again, Rick.

 

Rick Bickhram:  Thank you, David.

 

This has been Hull on Estates with the lawyers of Hull & Hull.  The podcast you have been listening to has been provided as an information service.  It is a summary of current legal issues in estates and estate planning.  It is not legal advice and you are reminded to always talk with a legal professional regarding your specific circumstances.

 

To listen to other podcasts, or to leave a question or comment, please visit our website at www.hullandhull.com.

 

Our theme music is Upper Structure by DJ AKid  and is courtesy of the Podsafe Music Network.

 

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Trust Claims and Non-Married Spouses - Hull on Estates Episode #84

Listen to Trust Claims and Non-Married Spouses

This week on Hull on Estates, David Smith and Megan Connolly reference the case Belvedere v. Brittain Estate to discuss constructive trust claims made against an estate by a non-married spouse.

Trust Claims and Non-Married Spouses - Hull on Estates Podcast #84

Posted on November 6th, 2007 by Hull & Hull LLP

 

David Smith:  Hi.  Welcome to Hull on Estates.  You’re listening to Episode #84 on November 6th, 2007.

 

Welcome to Hull on Estates, a series of podcasts for the Canadian legal community dealing with issues and insights surrounding estate planning in Canada.   Hosted by the lawyers of Hull & Hull, the podcast will touch on some key considerations when planning estates and Wills.  Now, here are today’s hosts.

 

David Smith: Hi, my name is David Smith.  I’m one of the partners at Hull & Hull LLP.  And with me is Megan Connolly, one of our associates.  Hi Megan.

 

Megan Connolly:  Hi David.

 

David Smith:  Megan, I thought today we would talk about constructive trust claims made against an estate by a non-married spouse.  And this was an issue that I recently wrote a blog on and noted that there is a fairly interesting case called Belvedere and Brittain Estate of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  Now before we get talking about the case, I just wanted to point out at the beginning the case is under appeal apparently, more as to the quantum of damages than anything else.  But it does provide a very interesting fact situation to discuss.

 

Megan Connolly:  The case involves an unmarried couple who had met in 2000 and had apparently moved in together in June, 2000 although that was under dispute in the case.  Now, on the deceased’s death, he didn’t provide for Laura, his common-law spouse, at all in his Will and made no other provision for her on his death.

 

David Smith:  That’s right, Megan.  And the claim made against the estate by Laura was based on several arguments.  She argued proprietary estoppel, basically saying that she entered into the relationship in reliance upon receiving certain gifts from the deceased’s estate.  But the primary basis upon which the Court ordered a constructive…awarded damages, was on the basis that there was found to exist a constructive trust in the estate for her benefit.

 

Megan Connolly:  Right.  Now she said that it was always her partner’s intention that on his death, she receive his RRSPs, the use of his house or alternatively, funds to purchase a new house, as well as a new car.  And in support of that, I guess she pointed out that in moving in with him, she had sold her home for I think less than its market value.  She had given up her car.  She hadn’t kept any of her possessions and she’d also I guess reduced her…she reduced the amount of time she spent working.

 

David Smith:  That’s right.  And so what the Court did, in terms of analyzing her claim, was looked at the various components of constructive trust and there is a three-fold test, which is an enrichment of the estate to the detriment of the claimant in the absence of any juristic reason.  Megan, what was it about the fact situation that made the Court think that she was enriched?  Or sorry, rather that the deceased was enriched?

 

Megan Connolly:  Well, as I said, when she moved in with him, she first of all had given everything up.  But she’d also spent a lot of time looking after his home.  He had a young child which she cared for.  She provided clerical support in his office.  She’d worked for Air Canada and she, I think, received heavily discounted flights for her friends and family as well as herself.  And both the deceased and his son, I guess, benefited from this.  Her family also had a condo in Florida that they would visit frequently and that they’d stay at.

 

David Smith:  When we talked about such an enrichment of the deceased, Megan, is it an enrichment of the estate, or is it, what do we mean exactly by enrichment?

 

Megan Connolly:  Well I guess basically it’s sort of the idea of getting something for nothing.  Here, the Court was saying that she’d provided, I guess, different services for him, whether it was through childcare, through maintenance to his property, to assistance with his business, etc., that she’d also been deprived as a result in that she’d given up income from her job, she’d sold her home and her car and I guess a Court’s interest is making sure that he didn’t receive anything without her also receiving a corresponding benefit.

 

David Smith:  It strikes me that the Court’s always interested to look at the relationship between her deprivation and his enrichment in the sense that there’s a trade-off there, isn’t there, between her loss and his gain.  And I guess that’s really what they’re talking about when they say that it’s got to be corresponding.  One thing I didn’t understand about the decision, quite frankly, was the fact that the Court considered the fact that apparently his death was unexpected and that she reacted very badly to this and caused her great emotional upset.  And the Court considered that as a factor to consider when looking at the phrase corresponding deprivation.  I mean, what do you think of that?  Because, to my mind, it’s not corresponding to any of the enrichment he gained…what do you think about that?

 

Megan Connolly:  No, it seemed like the Court was saying that, well he died, and it was really, really upsetting to her.  She’d apparently also been bipolar for a long time and I think this just worsened it.  She wasn’t working after his death.  And I think it seemed if not doubtful, at least questionable, whether she’d ever be able to work again.  And part of may be just, I guess, equity in a way, that the Court saw that, because of the situation, she was going to be severely I guess harmed in a sense, and wanted to correct that.  I’m not sure how solidly that’s grounded in legal principles.  I think it’s also worth mentioning that his estate was worth about $6,000,000.  So there seemed to be a lot of money to be spread around here.  And I think that was probably also a consideration.

 

David Smith:  And of course the third branch of the test is absence of juristic reason.  And again, this is a concept I wrestle with in the sense that I don’t think it’s always clear what a juristic reason could possibly be and what is an example of a juristic reason.  Do you have any thoughts on that?

 

Megan Connolly:  Well here, the defendants, the trust company, argued that her lifestyle had improved as a result of being with him.  So even if she was deprived and he was enriched, she too was also enriched by the fact that she went from, if not a low-paying job, a financial situation that wasn’t as comfortable as what she had when she was with the deceased.  And they sort of argued that that was a reason for his enrichment and her deprivation.  Now the Court didn’t accept that.  They said that, first of all, the improvement in her lifestyle was arguable, although I’m not sure if it is or not.  And that in any event, it didn’t constitute a juristic reason.  The Court also found that a lot of what she was doing was stuff she would have done even without him.  For example, the travel that they did a lot, was a result of her job at Air Canada.  And the Court found that well, she would have done that anyway.

 

David Smith:  That’s an interesting point, isn’t it?  So I guess really the Court’s got to look at all the circumstances.  And what struck me about this case to a large extent was, and maybe I’m being a bit cynical, but it seemed to me that the Court saw that she could not fit within the parameters of a support claim and under the SLRA, and looked for…well maybe looked for a way or looking at the facts, decided that there must be a way to benefit this woman, who had clearly given a great deal of herself to the benefit of this gentleman before he died.  And I guess, really, that’s what Courts of equity are there to do.

 

Megan Connolly:  And I think it’s also interesting that there was a lot of discussion in the decision about his intent.  The fact that even though he never made a Will, there was a lot of evidence that he’d intended to make one and that he’d intended to name her as the beneficiary of his RRSPs, which I think were worth about $2,500,000 at his death.  And there was also surrounding evidence from his friends and financial advisors that he’d always intended to do this.  And I think, just going back to the idea that he died in an accidental way, I think the Court was convinced that, well had he not died all of a sudden, he would have gone ahead and made these changes and that she would have become a beneficiary of the RRSPs and probably received some other money on his death.  So I think that was another, I guess, motivating reason for the Court to make the decision that it did.

 

David Smith:  Well that’s right.  I mean, as I understood the facts, the Court found that or considered evidence that he intended to marry her.  I think they’d even fixed a date.  And, of course, had he married her, that marriage would have revoked the Will, in which case she would have had all of the entitlements of a wife on an intestacy or under any Will that he would have made after that marriage, because of course the marriage would have revoked the pre-existing Will.

 

I guess to wrap it up, Megan, what I’d like to just touch on, or discuss, is the whole issue of damages here.  As I understand the nature of the appeal of this case, is primarily concerned with the quantum of damages.  The argument being that the value of the RRSP on a rollover was what she was entitled to receive. And I should point out the RRSP, as I understand it, no longer was in existence at the time of the judgment.  And so we’ve got a cash judgment payable by the estate in an amount equal to the RRSP on a rollover, even though the RRSP no longer exists.

 

Megan Connolly:  And I think that in this decision, the Court had also said that she wasn’t going to have to pay taxes on any of this, that to the extent taxes were payable, they’d be paid by the estate.

 

David Smith:  Which again is certainly a better result than would be the case had she made a support claim, in which case her support and entitlement, were it to be an income stream, would be taxable in her hands.

 

Megan Connolly:  And so I think this is another situation where, I mean, in the discussion of the case about constructive trusts, it was very interesting.  But I think it’s a situation where the Court sort of looked at a situation that seemed patently unfair and wanted to, I guess, manoeuvre the law in such a way as that she would get what she otherwise would have received from him.

 

David Smith:  Well that’s right and I mean, equitable principles are such that the law is always a flexible enough instrument and especially equity, which is again, we have to remember that estate courts historically were surrogate courts and courts of equity, rather than courts of law.  And so in that sense, the Court would be looking to make a fair decision all around.  And so in that sense, I think, you know, subject to any reversal on appeal, this is another interesting decision to consider any time as counsel we may be retained by a common-law spouse to consider a claim against an estate.

 

Megan Connolly:  Um, hmm, it is, so we’ll have to see what the Court of Appeal says.

 

David Smith:  Right.  Okay, well thanks Megan.

 

Megan Connolly:  Thank you, David.

 

David Smith:  Bye-bye.

 

This has been Hull on Estates with the lawyers of Hull & Hull.  The podcast you have been listening to has been provided as an information service.  It is a summary of current legal issues in estates and estate planning.  It is not legal advice and you are reminded to always talk with a legal professional regarding your specific circumstances.

 

To listen to other podcasts, or to leave a question or comment, please visit our website at www.hullandhull.com.

 

Our theme music is Upper Structure by DJ AKid  and is courtesy of the Podsafe Music Network.

 

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