Topics (and speakers) included:

• Family Law Update (Karon Bales)
• Shareholder Issues – The Family Business in Succession Planning (Frank Archibald)
• Dealing with Insolvent and Bankrupt Estates (Barry Corbin and Robert Klotz)
• The Non-Resident Factor in Estate Planning (Mary Anne Bueschkens and M. Elena Hoffstein)
• Update on the Trust and Estate Provisions in the Protocol to the Canada/U.S. Income Tax Treaty (Beth Webel and Jim Yager)
• New Strategies for Post-Mortem Tax Planning – The Eligible Dividend Rules and More (Heather Evans)
• Powers of Attorney and the Duty to Account – An Update (Liza Sheard)
• Powers of Appointment (Timothy Youdan)
• The Will is Not the Whole Picture - Integrating the Transfer of Wealth both Inside and Outside the Estate (Wendy Templeton)
• New Developments in Insurance and Estate Planning (Graham Carter)
• Update on Practice Directions for the Estates List (The Honourable Mr. Justice David M. Brown)
• Capacity and Other Issues in Power of Attorney and Guardianship Disputes (Jan Goddard)
• A Clinician’s Perspective on Assessing Testamentary Capacity and Related Capacities (Dr. Kenneth Shulman)
• Capacity Issues – The Perspective of the Hospital, Retirement Home and Group Home (Wendy Griesdorf)
• The Vulnerability of Pre-Death Gifts (Eric Hoffstein)
• The Scope of the Attorney’s Powers (Sender Tator)
• The Incapable Minor Turning 18 (Clare Burns)
• Remarks from the New Children’s Lawyer for the Province of Ontario (Debra Stephens)
• Marshalling the Evidence For and Against Capacity in a Will Challenge (Hilary Laidlaw)
• Short Circuiting the Frivolous Will Challenge (Hull and Hull’s Craig Vander Zee)
• Mediation of Capacity Issues – The Mediator’s Perspective (Felice Kirsh and Archie Rabinowitz)

If you were not able to attend, the seminar materials will be available from the Law Society of Upper Canada.

Thank you for reading,

Paul Trudelle

After dismissing the will challenge on the basis of due execution, testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval, the court turned to the issue of undue influence. Despite the presence of suspicious circumstances, the court held that the challengers, not the propounder, had the burden of proving undue influence. However, while the son did not have the burden of disproving coercion, his evidence was to be tested against the preponderance of probabilities that rationally emerge out the all the evidence in the case.

The deceased was found to be vulnerable and dependant upon her son for all aspects of her existence. Conversely, the son was found to have an aggressive and domineering personality, both in general and with respect to his desire for absolute ownership of the family holding company.

The court found that the son was very caring of his mother. However, it did not accept his evidence on the issue of undue influence. The court asked a number of rhetorical questions as to why the mother would make the will that she did, despite the circumstances. The court concluded that that will was procured by the undue influence of the son.

The will was therefore found to be invalid.

Paul Trudelle

As to testamentary capacity, the court referred to the oft – quoted decision of Banks v. Goodfellow, and the test for testamentary capacity.

It noted that the capacity required to direct the distribution of one’s estate by Will is “modest”. To be of a sound and disposing mind and memory, a testator must:

1.                  be aware that they are making a will that takes effect on their death;

2.                  understand the nature and extent of the estate to be disposed of by Will;

3.                  be aware of those having a claim to the estate;

4.                  have no disorder of the mind.

The court reviewed the evidence of the plaintiffs and the witnesses (other than the son) as to testamentary capacity. The court was satisfied that on the preponderance of the evidence, the testator had the necessary capacity to direct the disposition of her estate by will as of the date of the will.

As to knowledge and approval, the court noted that a suspicious circumstances raised in the case required that the son, as the propounder of the will, prove that the deceased knew of and approved of the contents of the will. The court did not accept the evidence of the son to the effect that the deceased had to carefully read her will and discuss it with him on numerous occasions. Despite this, the court concluded that the deceased knew of the provisions of the will that she signed.

To this point, the will survived most of the challenges to it. Will the will be accepted to probate? Can it withstand the final challenge: undue influence? Tune in tomorrow.

Paul Trudelle

In Hix v. Ewachniuk Estate, 2008 CarswellBC 1300 (Hinkson J.), the deceased was survived by a son and two daughters. The deceased, the son and the two daughters had varying levels of shareholdings in a holding company.

In a prior will, the deceased left her estate to her three children, equally. In a will drawn January 11, 2004, the deceased left her estate to her three children equally, on the condition that the two daughters transferred their shareholdings in the holding company to the son. The deceased died on June 1, 2006 at the age of 90. The daughters challenged the validity of the will, and the court considered the validity of the will from a number of perspectives.

The court first considered the issue of due execution of the will. The formal requirements necessary to execute a valid will are set out in the relevant legislation. While the court was not prepared to accept the evidence of the son with respect to the execution of the deceased’s will, it did accept the evidence of one of the two witnesses to the will. The court was satisfied that the will was signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses who were present at the same time and who subscribed the will in the presence of each other and the testator.

Court concluded that the will was validly executed. This aspect of the will challenge was rejected.

More tomorrow.

Paul Trudelle

In light of the recent amendments to the Trustee Act which appear to embrace the modern portfolio theory, it will be interesting to see how the Court will utilize this theory to assess a trustee's investment performance. Section 28 of the Trustee Act adopts an approach that is consistent with the modern portfolio theory.  Under this section, a trustee is insulated from liability if “the conduct of the trustee, which led to the loss from the trust, conformed to a plan or strategy, for the investment of the trust property, comprising reasonable assessments of risk and return that a prudent investor could adopt under comparable circumstances”.

Under the “statutory legal list” approach, which I described yesterday, a trustee was limited to investing trust assets in authorized investments.   However, with the development of the prudent investor rule, trustees are provided with a broader range of investment choices, which will likely increase their responsibility in determining an acceptable standard of care.

Presuming that a trustee is found liable for breaching the standard of care, section 29 of the Trustee Act permits a court to assess “the overall performance of the investments” when it is assessing damages.  Based on the language of section 29, it appears that a trustee may be allowed to offset the loss of a bad investment against the gain of a good investment.

The trusts and estates bar will be watching with interest to see how the judicial consideration of the prudent investor rule evolves.

Happy Super Bowl Weekend!  Go Patriots!

Rick

Prior to July 1999, trustees were required to make investments pursuant to the “statutory legal list” provided for in the Trustee Act. This had the effect of holding trustees accountable for each particular investment, rather then the investment portfolio as a whole. The principle was further illuminated by the anti-netting rule, which stated that a trustee, who committed a breach of trust, was not entitled to set off a gain in one transaction against a loss in another. However, through recent amendments to the Trustee Act, the statutory legal list was repealed and replaced with the Prudent Investor Rule.

The Prudent Investor Rule reflects the modern portfolio approach to investments, the emphasis being on the prudence of the portfolio as a whole as opposed to each particular component. This theory is captured in Section 27(5) of the Trustee Act. Section 27(5) requires “a trustee to consider … the role that each investment plays within the overall trust portfolio”. Furthermore, under section 27(6) “a trustee is required to diversify the investments of the trust property. It appears that under the modern portfolio approach, a trustee would not be breaching the standard of care, should he or she invest a substantial amount of trust assets into a single security. As described above, section 27(6) requires that the trustee consider diversifying the portfolio, which is necessary if the Prudent Investor Rule is to be followed. To conclude my topic, tomorrow I will consider the liability of a trustee with respect to the investment of trust assets.

Thanks for reading,

Rick

With the recent plummet in the stock market, I believe many trustees are considering how the stock market losses have affected the trust investments and what action they should take in the circumstances. 

Section 27 of the Trustee Act addresses the standard of care for trustees when investing assets held in a trust. Section 27(1) states, “in investing trust property, a trustee must exercise the care, skill, diligence and judgment that a prudent investor would exercise in making investments”. Section 27(2) states that “a trustee may invest trust property in any form of property in which a prudent investor might invest”.

Section 27(1) and (2) outlines the prudent investor rule. When investing trust assets, a trustee must comply with the prudent investor rule to protect himself or herself from liability.   Section 28 of the Trustee Act, emphasizes this point as it states that a Trustee will not be liable for losses arising from investments if the standard of the prudent investor is met. Nevertheless, the issue remains how does a trustee meet the “prudent investor” standard? In keeping with this theme, tomorrow I will address how a trustee’s investment performance may be assessed.

Thanks for reading, and have a great day!

Rick

Before July 2005, the Rules of Civil Procedure provided some sense of certainty to the Court’s broad discretion in awarding costs as the Rules provided a costs grid. The costs grid suggested that costs were to be determined by an hourly rate multiplied by the time spent. In 2004, the Court of Appeal in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council set forth the general principle as to the fixing of costs pursuant to Rule 57.01 and the costs grid. With respect to costs, the Court stated that the overall “objective is to fix an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay in the particular proceeding, rather than an amount fixed by the actual costs incurred by the successful litigant”. Subsequently, in July 2005, the Rules were amended. 

The amendment to the Rules abolished the costs grid and expanded on the list of factors, set out in Rule 57.01, which the Court may consider before making a cost award. Rule 57.01 was now expanded to include the principle of full indemnity and the reasonable expectations of an unsuccessful party to pay a cost award.

The principle of the reasonable expectations of an unsuccessful party to pay a cost award appears to provide the parties with some flexibility in obtaining the maximum cost award by permitting the successful party to establish the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.  

Thanks for reading, and have a great day!

Rick

Rule 14.05(3)(a) states that "a proceeding may be brought by application where these rules authorize the commencement of a proceeding by application or where the relief claimed is, the opinion, advice or direction of the court on a question affecting the rights of a person in respect of the administration of the estate of a deceased person or the execution of a trust".  In contrast, Rule 75.06(1) states that "any person who appears to have a financial interest in an estate may apply for directions … as to the procedure for bringing any matter before the court".

It is clear from the language of these rules that an Applicant may use either rule to apply for directions from the court.  The difference between the two rules lies in the relief that the Applicant seeks. 

Rule 14.05(3)(a) is a substantive remedy that addresses the rights of a person with respect to the administration of an estate or the execution of a trust.  Therefore an Applicant who relies on Rule 14.05(3)(a), is asking the court to make a determination of his or her rights in the context of an estate.  For example, whether or not an Applicant has an interest under the deceased's Last  Will and Testament.

Rule 75.06(1) is a procedural remedy.  In essence, Rule 75.06(1) provides the road-map for "any matter before the court".  Therefore an Applicant who utilizes Rule 75.06(1) may seek a court order that permits the disclosure of relevant documents to their matter and establish time-lines for the completion of a specific phase in their court proceeding.  For example, the court may decide that mediation should be completed within 90 days and as such, include a mediation clause in a court order.

In summary, both rules can may be used to apply to the court for direction, however with Rule 14.05 (3)(a), the Applicant is asking the court for a specific answer to a question affecting his or her rights, whereas with Rule 75.06(1), the Applicant is requesting that the court provide them with a guideline to their court proceeding.

Have a Great Day!

Rick Bickhram