Equitable Relief for Common-Law Spouses

Equitable remedies are pushing the boundaries of just what kind of claims may be made against an estate. The most apparent beneficiary of this willingness of the Courts to expand the scope of such relief would appear to be common law spouses (see the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kerr v. Baranow and our recent blog on the case).

In the October 2011 issue of Canadian Lawyer there is a good article on this whole issue entitled "Common Law Couples - til death do they part."  The author gives, in part, a summary of some of the legislation in other provinces as it has evolved to provide for common law spouses:

  • In Alberta, there is the Adult Interdependent Relationships Act and other legislation that "provide surviving spouses and common law partners the same rights to claim support from the estate and share in the deceased estate on intestacy [with the exception of the Dower Act]." 
  • In Manitoba, "major legislative amendments were proclaimed in 2004 such to create The Common-Law Partners’ Property and Related Amendments Act...Now in Manitoba, a common law partner is able to claim a share of a person’s estate if they’ve died without a will."
  • In Saskatchewan, "the Wills Act, 1996, The Administration of Estates Act, The Intestate Succession Act, 1996, The Dependants’ Relief Act, 1996, and The Family Property Act all treat married and common law couples who have cohabited for not less than two years the same,” says Maria Markatos, Crown counsel with the Ministry of Justice’s Public Law Division in Regina.

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Common Law Spousal Property Entitlements Prior to Death

The recent Supreme Court of Canada case of Kerr v. Baranow  recognized common law relationships and gave guidance on the appropriate approach to address property and compensation claims in such relationships.

Unlike married spouses, there is no legislative scheme for common law couples to determine property division upon the breakdown of a relationship. 

Following a relationship breakdown, one common law partner may claim that the other would be "unjustly enriched" if permitted to retain certain property without some kind of monetary compensation or without some sort of ownership interest in the land or investment. Typically, the aggrieved partner advances a “resulting trust” claim.

The Supreme Court decided that, to establish an unjust enrichment claim, the claimant must show: (i) that there was a joint family venture and (ii) that there is a link between his or her contributions and the accumulation of wealth. Whether there is a “joint family venture” depends on such factors as:

  • mutual effort (i.e. whether the parties worked collaboratively towards common goals);
  • economic integration (i.e. joint bank account/ sharing of expenses or common savings);
  • actual intent express or inferred; and
  • priority of the family (i.e. detrimental reliance on the relationship, by one or both parties, for the sake of the family). 

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Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Kerr v. Baranow & Vanasse v. Seguin - Part 3 of 3

As has been my mantra all week, Justice Cromwell, who delivered the reasons for the Court in Kerr v. Baranow & Vanasse v. Seguin, commented that for unmarried persons in domestic relationships in most common law provinces, judge made law is the only option for addressing the property consequences of the breakdown of those relationships. 

A property interest by resulting trust arises where 1) there is a gratuitous transfer of property from one partner to the other, or 2) there is joint contribution by two partners to the acquisition of property, title to which is in the name of only one of them.

Added to this has been the “purely Canadian invention” of the “common intention” resulting trust, whereby a resulting trust could arise based solely on both partners having a common intention that one holds property for the beneficial interest of both. However, the Court declared that this concept was doctrinally unsound and should have no continuing role in the resolution of domestic property disputes. 

A far better approach was to apply the law of unjust enrichment and the remedial constructive trust, which provide a much less artificial, more comprehensive and more principled basis to address property claims on the breakdown of domestic relationships. To be successful, a plaintiff had to establish 1) an enrichment of the defendant by the plaintiff 2) a corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff, and 3) the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment.

The appropriate remedy for unjust enrichment will most often be monetary though there may be some circumstances in which a monetary remedy will be inadequate and a proprietary remedy is required.  

When quantifying a monetary remedy, a quantum meruit approach should be applied and value assessed on a “value survived” basis, which is preferable to imposing a remedial constructive trust. To be entitled to a monetary remedy on a value survived basis, the claimant must show both that there was a joint family venture and that there was a link between his or her contributions and the accumulation of wealth.

This decision provides much guidance to courts in determining the property rights of unmarried partners and will no doubt prove instructive in cases where individuals die without having provided properly with respect to the property accumulated during their lifetime with a common law spouse.

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Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Kerr v. Baranow & Vanasse v. Seguin - Part 2 of 3

In of Vanasse v. Seguin (the companion case to Kerr v. Baranow, heard at the same time) the common law couple was together for 12 years, from 1993 to 2005. For the first four years both parties pursued their careers. The common law wife (“wife”) then left her job to move to Halifax so the common law husband (“husband”) could pursue a business opportunity. Over the next three and a half years, their two children were born and the wife stayed at home to care for the family. The husband stepped down as CEO of the business he started and they returned to Ottawa in 1998, where they bought a home in both their names as joint tenants. In 2000, the husband received approximately $11 million for his shares in the business and from that time, until their separation in 2005, he participated more with the domestic chores.  

The trial judge found that there was no unjust enrichment for the first and last periods of the couple’s cohabitation, but held that the husband had been unjustly enriched at the wife’s expense during the period in which the children were born and was entitled to half of the value of the wealth the husband accumulated during the period of unjust enrichment, less her interest in the home and RRSPs in her name. 

The Ontario Court of Appeal set aside this award and directed that the proper approach to valuation was a quantum meruit calculation in which the value each party received from the other was assessed and set off, essentially treating the wife as an unpaid employee.

In the Vanasse appeal, the central problem was how to quantify a monetary award for unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court of Canada found that a monetary award for unjust enrichment need not, as a matter of principle, always be calculated on a fee-for-services basis, allowed the appeal, and restored the order of the trial judge.

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Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Kerr v. Baranow & Vanasse v. Seguin - Part 1 of 3

The Supreme Court of Canada recently considered the property rights of common law spouses in the companion cases of Kerr v. Baranow & Vanasse v. SeguinThese cases required consideration of the following legal issues:

  1. The role of the “common intention” resulting trust in claims by domestic partners. 
  2. Whether the monetary remedy for a successful unjust enrichment claim must always be assessed on a quantum meruit basis.
  3. Mutual benefit conferral in the context of an unjust enrichment claim and when this should be taken into account. 
  4. The role the parties’ reasonable expectations play in the unjust enrichment analysis. 

In Kerr v. Baranow, a common law couple in their late 60’s split after 25 years, during which time both partners worked and contributed to their mutual welfare. The common law wife (“wife”) claimed property on the basis of resulting trust and unjust enrichment.   The common law husband (husband”) counterclaimed that the wife had been unjustly enriched by his housekeeping and personal assistance after she suffered a debilitating stroke.

The trial judge awarded the wife $315,000, (1/3 of the value of the home the couple shared, but which was in the husband’s name) by way of resulting trust and unjust enrichment, because the wife had provided $60,000 worth of equity and assets at the beginning of their relationship. 

 The B.C. Court of Appeal allowed the husband’s appeal because it found the wife did not make a financial contribution to the acquisition or improvement of the property, and ordered a new trial for the husband’s counterclaim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the wife’s appeal from the dismissal of her unjust enrichment claim and ordered a new trial.  Her appeal from the order dismissing her claim in resulting trust was dismissed.  The order for a new hearing of the husband’s counterclaim was affirmed.

Tomorrow’s blog will cover the facts in Vanasse v. Seguin and in our last blog of the week we will explore the main issues discussed in relation to property rights of common law spouses in the context of these two cases.

 

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Common Law Partners' Rights to Property

Yesterday’s blog considered the fact that a common law spouse has no beneficial entitlement to his or her deceased spouse's estate on an intestacy.  There are, however, remedies available to the disappointed spouse. 

The first of these is a claim for dependant support found in Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, whereby a common law spouse (or any other “dependant” of the deceased)  can ask for support where no adequate provision has been made for the dependant by the deceased.  

The Court has broad discretion to grant relief that, according to section 62(3) of the Act, can take a variety of forms, including the transfer, use or occupation of specified property in satisfaction of the dependant’s need for support.  

In many situations involving long-term common law relationships, there may also be an argument for equitable (as opposed to legal) ownership of property by the surviving common law spouse. These rights will be founded on the principles of unjust enrichment and include, for example, resulting or constructive trust, and proprietary estoppel.

The Supreme Court of Canada has recently considered two cases that provide guidance on unjust enrichment in the context of common law relationships. The Court released one decision in the matters of Kerr v. Baranow, and Vanasse v. Seguin, which I will be discussing in the next couple of blogs.    

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McMillan v. Johnson (Estate)

The recent B.C. Court of Appeal decision of McMillan v. Johnson (Estate) 2011 BCCA 48, deals with the valuation of an unjust enrichment claim of a long-time common law wife against the estate of her deceased common law husband. 

The couple lived together for almost 40 years and both contributed to a family fishing business, of which the deceased was the sole shareholder.  The deceased did not properly provide for his wife and although she would have had a claim under the Wills Variation Act, she was out of time and so claimed a constructive trust against the only valuable asset in the estate, a $2.4 Million shareholder’s loan owed to the deceased by the fishing business. 

The trial below proceeded summarily and rather than declaring a constructive trust, the trial judge awarded the wife a monetary remedy of 50% of the value of the loan ($1.2 Million). 

On appeal the estate argued that the value should have been assessed at 50% of the market value of the company at the time of trial, which would reflect the decline in the fishery since death, and that the judge erred in awarding the book value of the loan valued as at the date of death. The estate led no evidence of the actual value of the company at trial and sought to introduce this as fresh evidence on appeal.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered on the question of the value of the loan and the company as at the date of the new trial.  Fresh evidence as to the value of the company was not allowed. The judge intended to award a monetary remedy in lieu of a proprietary remedy, and therefore the valuation date should have been the date of trial.   

If you are interested in a more in depth consideration of the case law on constructive trusts, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, and whether/when an in personam monetary remedy or proprietary remedy is appropriate, you should refer to the decision for some helpful comment on these issues.  

 

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Remember the Evidence Act!

How does one prove a negative?  This is a challenge facing many estates: after a person dies, individuals spring forth requesting compensation for services rendered on a quantum meruit basis or alleging that promises were made by the deceased.  A common example is a claim that one provided domestic services such as cleaning, shopping or laundry. 

The riddle of proving a negative is quite relevant to estates litigation because the star witness for the estate is usually, by definition, dead.  Fortunately, since estate trustees can't prove negatives, they don't have to.  Section 13 of the Evidence Act specifically addresses this scenario, requiring independent corroboration of evidence in claims against estates.   The provision is designed to prevent claims that consist of mere allegations, which are easy to make, difficult to refute and expensive to litigate.  There is a great deal of case law on what constitutes corroboration, the standard of proof and so forth but the provision is a great deterrent to frivolous claims.

It seems trite to say but the Act is worth a review, even for non-litigators.  It's full of counter-intuitive gems that are easily forgotten: for instance, section 9 the Evidence Act states that witnesses are not excused from answering questions tending to criminate them under any Act of the Legislature.   

Have a great day,

Chris Graham

 

 

 

 

Karkus v. Cotroneo 2007 - Hull on Estates #93

Listen to Karkus v. Cotroneo 2007

This week on Hull on Estates, Paul Trudelle and Diane Vieira discuss the case of Karkus v. Cotroneo 2007. The case addresses many of the issues that estate lawyers face on a daily basis, such as: proving or disproving gifts, slander of title and the importance of corroborative evidence.

Karkus v. Cotroneo 2007 - Hull on Estates Podcast #93

Posted on January 15th, 2008 by Hull & Hull LLP

 

Paul Trudelle: Hi and welcome to Hull on Estates.  You’re listening to Episode 93 on Tuesday, January 15th, 2008.

 

Welcome to Hull on Estates, a series of podcasts for the Canadian legal community dealing with issues and insights surrounding estate planning in Canada.   Hosted by the lawyers of Hull & Hull, the podcast will touch on some key considerations when planning estates and Wills.  Now, here are today’s hosts.

 

Paul Trudelle: I’m Paul Trudelle.

 

Diane Vieira:  I’m Diana Vieira.

 

Paul Trudelle:  Hi Diane.  How are you?

 

Diane Vieira:  I’m good.  How are you?

 

Paul Trudelle:  Very good.  This is our first podcast together and our first podcast of 2008, so I wish everyone a Happy New Year.  And why don’t we get into what we thought we would talk about today.

 

Diane Vieira:  Sure.  This is an interesting case that deals with a lot of things that we deal with in our practice.

 

Paul Trudelle:  Yeah, the case is Karkus and Cotroneo.  It’s a 2007 case, April 19, 2007, out of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  It’s a decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice Sheppard.  And I thought that it would be great to talk about this case because it deals with a number of issues that we deal with day in and day out.  It deals with issues such as gifts, proving a gift or disproving a gift, corroborative evidence required, remedies where there is a finding that there was no gift.  It talks about resulting trusts, set-offs, slander of title, costs regarding Certificates of Pending Litigation when those are resorted to early in the litigation, and also costs of the litigation.  So there’s a lot in this relatively short case…11 pages…but I thought we would spend a little time going through some of those issues.   Perhaps we can talk a bit about the background or the facts of the case.

 

Diane Vieira:  Oh, sure.  This is a case where the deceased died without a Will and her daughter was appointed the estate trustee.  The deceased was a business woman and near the end of her life, her business had been failing so there was a number of creditors.  And her daughter, the estate trustee, who is the plaintiff in this action, was looking through her mother’s financial records and an entry in her bank book showed a $65,000 transfer from her mother to her mother’s boyfriend, who’s the defendant in this case.

 

Paul Trudelle:  Right.  And I think just before we go on, I think the fact that the deceased was in some financial difficulty in her business, is an important factor that the Court relies on later on, so that’s important to note.

 

Diane Vieira:  Later on, the defendant admits that he received the $65,000.  His position is that this was a gift.  The daughter’s position is that this represents money that the defendant was holding on behalf of his mother.  A little more explanation to that was that the $65,000 the defendant used to purchase a property.  And then on that property, the defendant’s name is listed alone, but the property is listed as registered as being in trust.

 

Paul Trudelle:  That’s right.  And I think that’s important as well.  The Court deals with the resulting trust claim and looks at that factor, and we’ll talk about that briefly in a second.  So in essence the claim was by the estate for the return of the $65,000 and for a claim that the defendant held a property on a resulting trust and the estate had an interest in that property.  The Court looked at the evidence with respect to the gift and before doing that, set out the test that is required and what the estate must argue or try to establish in order to show that there was a debt or resulting trust and what the defendant needs to show in order to prove that there was in fact a gift.

 

Diane Vieira:  I just wanted to…another point of fact is where the $65,000 came from and when it was transferred.  The deceased had sold her house and she was moving in…she moved in with her boyfriend, who is the defendant.  And the $65,000 represents the proceeds of the estate…the proceeds of the sale of the house, excuse me.  And the money wasn’t gifted or transferred to the defendant until six or seven months later on, which is something that the Court reflected on.

 

Paul Trudelle:  That’s right. They looked at the fact that the parties had moved in together, the $65,000 was used to, in part, to purchase this house and make renovations that the plaintiff wanted.  The Court considered the fact that the onus is on the defendant to prove, or the recipient to prove that this was a gift, there was no presumption that would work in his favour.  And in fact, the presumptions which aren’t really referred to, would be the opposite, that there was a resulting trust or the money was owed back to the estate.  And the Court found ultimately that the defendant wasn’t successful in proving that this was a gift.  His evidence was that the money was used…was given to him to help with the purchase of the house and to pay for expenses and that was contrary to a finding of a gift.  Just another point on that - the Court refers to the evidence required in order to establish a claim by or against an estate and dealt with the issue of corroborative evidence.  Perhaps we can talk a bit about what corroborative evidence is required and what the rule is there.

 

Diana Vieira:  With respect to corroborative evidence, Section 13 of the Evidence Act requires that there be some corroboration of the material evidence.  And the onus is the civil litigation onus, but with corroboration.  And in this case, the judge and the Court had problems with the defendant and the plaintiff’s evidence.  He called that evidence unreliable.

 

Paul Trudelle:  Right.  He felt that the evidence of the parties was of questionable credibility and in the absence of any corroborative evidence, he wasn’t able to find that there was in fact a gift.  And as you mentioned, the Court referred to the burden on the defendant to prove it but said that there was also what he said was a healthy scepticism in addition to that.  Now there’s other cases that talk about whether there’s a higher burden on a party.  The burden is still the civil burden but the Courts will look at these claims with some scepticism.

 

So the result of the defendant’s failure to prove that it was a gift meant that money was owing to the estate.  The Court went on to deal with the issue of whether the estate had a trust claim against the defendant.  And the Court dismissed the trust claim for a number of reasons.  The first reason, or one of the reasons was that in establishing a trust, there is case law to the effect that evidence of an illegal scheme will not be received to support a resulting trust.  And the illegal scheme that the Court referred to here was the fact that the monies were transferred by the deceased to the plaintiff probably for the purpose of avoiding creditors.  And as a result, they had…the Court had a difficult time in finding that the estate could rely on the doctrine of resulting trust in these circumstances.   So how did the Court deal with the money owing to the estate then?

 

Diane Vieira:  The Court goes on to find that the defendant does owe money to the estate.  It’s a debt to the estate.  And he then goes on to discuss the concept of unjust enrichment.

 

Paul Trudelle:  Yeah, and the Court found that the money was owing to the estate and I guess the defendant had assets here.  The Court felt that it wasn’t necessary, in fact, to rely on the concept of trust or impose a trust over the property owned by the defendant.  A judgment, a monetary judgment, was sufficient.  You mentioned the unjust enrichment part of it and the Court talked a bit there about when they will find unjust enrichment in order to bring in the equitable remedy.

 

Diane Vieira:  Yes, the Court refers to the Supreme Court of Canada case, Peter vs. Bellow and the three steps that are needed for a finding of unjust enrichment.  And all three were here in this case.  There was an enrichment on behalf of the defendant receiving the $65,000 and a corresponding deprivation to the deceased, now the estate of the deceased, and then an absence for the reason of this enrichment.

 

Paul Trudelle:  Yeah, but having found all of those circumstances present, the Court still goes on to say that they won’t impose the equitable remedy of a constructive trust.  The Court refers to that Supreme Court of Canada decision and extracts a point to the effect that a monetary award would be the appropriate remedy in many cases, and that was the case here.  And the Court concludes that a monetary award is appropriate and makes an Order that the defendant pay back the $65,000 to the estate.  However, he doesn’t end there.

 

Diane Vieira:  No, it’s…the Court goes on to find that the estate is not entitled to that full $65,000 because the defendant did provide something in the excess of $20,000 in renovations to the house.  And if the deceased’s $65,000 was in a gift to the defendant, then the money that he contributed to the relationship was also not a gift. 

 

Paul Trudelle:  That’s right.  So in effect, they awarded the defendant…they made an award in favour of the defendant with respect to his Counterclaim for money that he said he spent on behalf of the plaintiff, and that reduced the recovery by the estate.  There is also the issue of a claim by the defendant for slander of title.  The defendant alleged that a Certificate of Pending Litigation put on his property was slander of title, and the Court dealt with that in very short order.

 

Diane Vieira:  Yes, the Court found that the plaintiffs did not…didn’t have a credible position to have had that Certificate of Pending Litigation registered.  And consequently they awarded the money that the defendant had spent on removing that Certificate, credited back to the defendant.

 

Paul Trudelle:  That’s right.  And finally, on the issue of costs of the action itself, the Court considered the fact that the plaintiff had some success, made recovery for the estate.  However, it didn’t establish its claim for resulting trust.  The Court also felt that the evidence of the witnesses was unreliable to a certain extent and in fact in some parts the judge said that in some parts, the evidence was fabricated.  And as a consequence of that he ordered that there be no order as to costs, and each party had to bear its own costs.

 

Well, I think that’s an interesting case on a number of grounds.  We’ve touched on a few of the points that the case deals with.  I recommend the case highly to anyone dealing with those types of situations where there are gifts, where you’re considering a claim for a resulting trust, an interesting counterclaim where you’re faced with a claim for the return of a gift or money advanced on the basis of benefits provided to the deceased, and also considerations for dealing with Certificates of Pending Litigation and the costs that may be involved in that.

 

Well thank you very much, Diane.

 

Diane Vieira:  Thanks Paul.

 

This has been Hull on Estates with the lawyers of Hull & Hull.  The podcast you have been listening to has been provided as an information service.  It is a summary of current legal issues in estates and estate planning.  It is not legal advice and you are reminded to always talk with a legal professional regarding your specific circumstances.

 

To listen to other podcasts, or to leave a question or comment, please visit our website at www.hullandhull.com.

 

Our theme music is Upper Structure by DJ AKid  and is courtesy of the Podsafe Music Network.

 

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