Toronto Estate Law Blog : Toronto Estate Lawyer : Hull & Hull Law Firm : Trust Mediation and Succession Planning : Serving Ontario, Ottawa, Mississauga, Hamilton

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I recently read an Ontario decision involving a will challenge and the court granted summary judgment to the estate trustee on the issue that the Testator had the requisite testamentary capacity to execute her Last Will and Testament. 

In Quinlan v. Caron, the Deceased executed her Last Will and Testament on May 18, 2007 (the “Will”) and she subsequently died on September 7, 2008. Two days before executing the Will, the Deceased underwent a capacity assessment that was recorded on video. The doctor who conducted the capacity assessment concluded that the Deceased had the requisite capacity to create a new Will.

The daughter of the Deceased commenced a Will Challenge alleging that the Deceased lacked the mental capacity to execute the Will and undue influence. The Estate Trustee is the son of the Deceased and brought a motion for summary judgment against his sister, arguing that there were no genuine issues requiring a trial as his sister’s claim was not supported by any evidence.

The Honourable Justice Tuck put a lot of weight on the capacity assessment and granted summary judgment to the Estate Trustee on the issue of the Deceased’s capacity; however Justice Tuck dismissed the Estate Trustee’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of undue influence. In the decision, Justice Tuck held that “matters of credibility requiring resolution on a case of conflicting evidence ought to go to trial” and he rationalized that there was conflicting evidence in this case, which could suggest that the Deceased was unduly influenced.

Thank you for reading and have a great weekend,

Rick Bickhram - Click here for more information on Rick Bickhram. 

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Attorneys for property who receive gifts from grantors tomorrow will have to give them back, unless they have good evidence supporting the fact of the gift.  The rule that fiduciaries (including attorneys for property) must prove purported gifts is stated in Cooke v. Lamotte(1851), 15 Beav. 234 at page 239.

Justice Sheard applied this rule in Kee v. Yip [1995] O.J. No. 2879, disallowing a series of transfers by an attorney to himself, stating with respect to one such transfer, “The burden on Tom Kee to show that his mother gave him the $20,000 is a heavy one. His evidence, simply the assertion that this transaction, one of many that he did under power of attorney, was intended by her as a gift to him falls well short of discharging that burden of proof. Under the principle stated in Cooke v. Lamotte, supra, the $20,000 cannot be allowed as a gift and must be refunded." 

Even more recently, in Volchuk v. Kotsis, 2007 CanLII 28527 (ON S.C.) Justice Langdon disallowed a series of purported gifts (cheques and money transfers) effected by an attorney, noting in addition that attorneys were precluded from relying solely on their own evidence by section 13 of the Ontario Evidence Act, which provides that the claimant “shall not obtain a verdict, judgment or decision on his or her own evidence in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the deceased person, unless such evidence is corroborated by some other material evidence.” 

In estates litigation, this rule is very useful in passings of accounts initiated pursuant to section 42 of the Sustitute Decisions Act by disappointed beneficiaries of an estate against the deceased's former attorney for property.  Of course, this rule forms part of the Common Law and is not confined to passing of accounts proceedings.

Merry Christmas to fiduciaries including attorneys, and enjoy your presents.

Chris Graham

Christopher M.B. Graham - Click here for more information on Chris Graham.

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Part V of Ontario's Succession Law Reform Act ("SLRA") establishes a mechanism whereby qualifying dependants can claim support from the estate of a deceased.  Section 72 of the SLRA is a deeming provision that includes certain non-estate assets as part of the estate for the purposes of calculating the value of the estate, and allows such assets to be charged ("clawed back") by a support Order made under section 63 of the SLRA. 

The recent case of Simson v. De Bartolo 2009 CanLII 38493 (ON S.C.) interprets section 72(1) and applies Cummings v. Cummings 2004 CanLII 9339 (ON C.A.), the Court of Appeals decision holding that support awards are subject to moral considerations.  One issue following Cummings has been whether moral considerations justify a support award in and of themselves, or whether moral considerations are merely relevant to quantum of support following a determination that a support award is appropriate.

The applicant in Simson v. De Bartolo was litigation guardian for her child, born out of wedlock to the deceased and the actual support claimant.  When the applicant told the deceased's wife about their relationship and the child, the deceased transferred these properties to his wife (from joint ownership) and made a will disinheriting the child.  Later, the deceased died virtually penniless.  At issue in a motion was whether properties transferred by the deceased to his wife 10 years prior to his death could be deemed part of the deceased's estate under any enumerated grounds in section 72(1). 

Justice Lemon held that these assets could not be "clawed back" under s. 72(1).  Most particularly, a transfer of land to another party in the absence of an express written trust instrument does not fall within section 72(1)(e).  Of course, the transfer may still be impressed with a trust, as Justice Lemon pointed out, and if such trust pulls the asset into the estate, the SLRA provides for protection of the dependant pursuant to section 67.  Moral considerations were relevant in determining quantum of support, but not whether an asset forms part of the estate.

The facts in Simson v. De Bartolo appear to have precluded the court from addressing the Cummings question, at least in the motion being heard.  However, section 72 has been clarified.

Enjoy your day,

Chris Graham

Chris M.B. Graham - Click here for more information on Chris Graham.

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The recent case of Re Henry (2009) CanLII 12329 (ON S.C.) is an excellent illustration of how a court scrutinizes evidence in a will challenge. 

In Re Henry, the deceased died on May 28, 2005.  Two weeks earlier, on May 12, 2005, he had made a Will designating his second wife as his sole beneficiary.  The deceased's son from a prior marriage challenged the will on the grounds of undue influence, lack of testamentary capacity and lack of knowledge and approval of the contents of the will.   

The trial judge found in favour of the second wife on all issues: due execution was shown, the deceased had testamentary capacity along with full knowledge and approval of the contents of the will.  The challenger's evidence, which consisted largely of his and his sister's testimony, did not bear scrutiny: some of it was inadmissible, testimony appeared reconstructed as opposed to remembered, testimony contained factual inconsistencies, legal submissions contained errors of law and so on.  By contrast, the evidence brought by the second wife was accepted in whole.

No new law is generated in Re Henry, at least not per se.  But there is a concise consideration of the applicable standard of proof which will be helpful for any lawyer making submissions regarding evidence in a will challenge.  Newbould J. points out that the principle in Vout v. Hay, [1995] S.C.R. 6 that evidence of suspicious circumstances must "be scrutinized in accordance with the gravity of the suspicion" may no longer be good law as a result of F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 S.C.C. 53.  F.H. v. McDougall states "[t]here is only one legal rule and that is in all cases, evidence must be scrutinized with care by the trial judge."  So which is it: Vout v. Hay or F.H. v McDougall? 

Having laid out the jurisprudence, Justice Newbould states:

"I need not decide in this case whether the passage from Vout v. Hay that I have referred to is still good law because in my view the evidence is the same regardless of whether the evidence is scrutinized with greater care in accordance with the gravity of the suspicious circumstances.  I have taken care to scrutinize all of the evidence".

Have a great day,

Chris Graham